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THE PERILS OF UNPUBLISHED NON-PRECEDENTIAL
FEDERAL APPELLATE OPINIONS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS STATE-CREATED
DANGER DOCTRINE IN ONE CIRCUIT
Sarah E. Ricks*
Abstract: About 80% of federal appellate decisions are non-precedential. This Article
examines the practical consequences for district courts and litigants confronting inconsistent
appellate opinions issued by the same federal circuit. Specifically, this is a case study
comparing the divergent binding and non-precedential opinions applying one frequently
invoked constitutional theory within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the
"state-created danger" theory of substantive due process.
The comparison demonstrates that the risks of non-precedential opinions are real. During
the six-year interval between binding state-created danger decisions, the Third Circuit created
inconsistent non-precedential opinions on the identical legal theory. Doctrinal divergence
between the Third Circuit's binding and non-precedential opinions has undermined the
predictive value of precedential state-created danger decisions, creating an obstacle to
settlement at both the trial and appellate levels. In turn, district courts' unpredictable
application of the non-precedential opinions has undermined the critical appellate functions
of ensuring that like cases are treated alike, that judicial decisions are not arbitrary, and that
legal issues resolved at the appellate level need not be relitigated before the district courts.
The practice of issuing non-precedential opinions is justified on efficiency grounds, as a
mechanism for overburdened appellate courts to manage their dockets. But doctrinal
inconsistency between the Third Circuit's precedential and non-precedential opinions
undercuts the efficiency rationale because doctrinal divergences may have led plaintiffs and
defendants to value cases differently-potentially leading to more litigation, fewer
settlements, and additional need for judicial decision-making.
This Article proposes several reforms to reduce doctrinal inconsistency between
precedential and non-precedential opinions. Because an appellate court should weigh the
same considerations in making each of its publication decisions, the Third Circuit should
replace its amorphous publication guideline with specific criteria. The Article concludes by
suggesting that, consistent with the common law tradition of empowering the applying court

Clinical Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Pro Bono Research Project, Rutgers
University School of Law-Camden. J.D. 1990, Yale Law School; B.A. 1985, Bamard College of
Columbia University. I am indebted to the Honorable Walter K. Stapleton and the Honorable
Theodore A. McKee, both of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for insightful
comments on an earlier draft. I am grateful to William Richman, Earl Maltz, Allan Stein, Louis
Sirico, Susan Kosse, Sue Liemer, Jane lstvan, Thomas Dolgenos, Richard Feder, Susan Thrower,
Hollee Temple, members of the Rutgers-Camden clinical faculty scholarship colloquium, and
participants in the 2005 Legal Writing Institute Writers Workshop and 2005 Central States Region
Writing Conference, for their thoughtful recommendations on earlier drafts. Thank you to the
Association of Legal Writing Directors for financial support and to Meghan Murray, Marie S.
Marino, Yaakov Brenner, John Basiak, and Philip Italiano for research assistance.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:217, 2006

to assess the persuasive value of a judicial decision, the Third Circuit should no longer refuse
to cite its own non-precedential opinions, and should follow several circuits in expressly
according persuasive value to its non-precedential opinions.
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INTRODUCTION
Shannon Schieber, a University of Pennsylvania graduate student,
was murdered in her Philadelphia apartment.' Nadine White, the mother
of a young son, was murdered in her Philadelphia apartment.2 In both
cases, neighbors had called police because of noises from the
apartments. In both cases, police responded but refused to break down
the door. In both cases, parents of the murder victims filed state-created
danger claims in federal district court against the police officers and the
city. One judge dismissed the parent's claim, expressly following a non-

1. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 156 F. Supp. 2d 451, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2001), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 F.3d 409 (3d Cir. 2003).
2. White v. City of Philadelphia, 118 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566-67 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
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precedential federal appellate decision.3 The other judge allowed the
parents' claim to survive summary judgment, ignoring the nonprecedential appellate decision that could have foreclosed the parents'
claim.4
While the risk that district courts will apply non-precedential opinions
inconsistently raises serious concerns, non-precedential federal appellate
decision-making has recently attracted public attention for other reasons.
On April 12, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States approved
new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 which, if finalized, will
prohibit federal appellate courts from restricting citation of nonprecedential opinions. The prospect of the rule change, among other
events, reheated national debate about the legitimacy and uncertain
persuasive value of non-precedential federal appellate opinions. 6 The EGovernment Act of 2002 increased the accessibility and potential use of
these opinions by requiring all federal circuits to post their non-7
precedential opinions in a "text searchable format" on their websites.
3. Id. at 573, 577.
4. Schieber, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
5. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/index.html#supreme0406 (last visited Apr. 23, 2006) (announcing that the new rule will take
effect on Dec. 1, 2006 unless Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer it); Advisory
Comm. on Appellate Rules, Table of Agenda Items (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
apdocket.pdf; How Appealing, http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/0905.html (Sept. 20, 2005,
16:55 EST); How Appealing, http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/0605.html (June 16, 2005, 21:20
EST). The revised proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) provides: "Citation Permitted. A court may
not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written
dispositions that have been; (i) designated as 'unpublished,' 'not for publication,' 'nonprecedential,' 'not precedent,' or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007." Memorandum
from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Judge David F.
Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Report of Advisory Comm. on
Appellate Rules (Oct. 7, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov (follow "Federal Rulemaking"
hyperlink; then follow "Pending Rules Amendments" hyperlink; then follow "Appellate Rule 32.1"
hyperlink). For discussions of the proposed Rule, see, for example, Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation
Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 473 (2003);
Niketh Velamoor, Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 to Require that Circuits
Allow Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 561 (2004); TIM REAGAN ET AL.,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

(2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Citatio2.pdf/$File/Citatio2.pdf;
Minutes of Fall 2004 Meeting of Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules (Nov. 9, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/appl 104.pdf; Minutes of Spring 2004 Meeting of Advisory
Comm. on Appellate Rules (Apr. 13-14, 2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf, Minutes of Fall 2002 Meeting of Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules (Nov. 18,
2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/appi 102.pdf.
6. See sources cited supranote 5 and accompanying text.
7. E-Govemment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Star. 2899, 2913 (2003).

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
Moreover, as of 2002, non-precedential opinions of federal appellate
courts have been printed in hard copy in their own reporter, the Federal
Appendix, rendering the label "unpublished" a misnomer. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit amended its
internal operating rules to provide that unpublished dispositions entered
on or after January 1, 2002 "may be cited as precedent," 8 even though
the authoring panel itself saw no precedential value. 9 Most famously, an
Eighth Circuit panel, in Anastasoff v. United States,'° declared the
circuit's internal rule designating unpublished opinions as nonprecedential to be an unconstitutional expansion of Article III judicial
power." While the Eighth Circuit quickly vacated Anastasoff as moot,
the decision sparked a lively national discussion by holding that any
exercise of the judicial power must be binding on future panels because
the alternative would be "an approach to tyranny and arbitrary power, to
the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of all the just
checks upon judicial authority."'"

Third Circuit non-precedential opinions issued before January 2002 were not released for online
publication and are not searchable in electronic form. See Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at
Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 211
& n.58 (2001). For example, a Westlaw search of the Third Circuit's unpublished database showed
10,728 documents from December 17, 1996 to June 13, 2005. Of those, approximately 5880 were
issued before January 2002. But the reasoning of these opinions remains difficult to locate because
only a handful (about twenty-five) are available in full text online in Westlaw and, of those, many
consist solely of one- or two-line orders. Usually, the online opinion consists of the "table" citation
and the few words found in the published table dispositions printed in the Federal Reporters. Since
January 1, 2002, the Third Circuit has posted non-precedential opinions in counseled cases on its
website. Judge Edward Becker, Statement to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Apr. 13,
2004), http://www.nonpublication.com/Becker statement.pdf.
8. D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Court Rules"
hyperlink; then follow "Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Circuit Rules/FRAP" hyperlink)
("Unpublished dispositions entered on or after January 1, 2002. All unpublished orders or
judgments of this court, including explanatory memoranda (but not including sealed opinions),
entered on or after January 1, 2002, may be cited as precedent. Counsel should review the criteria
governing published and unpublished opinions in Circuit Rule 36, in connection with reliance upon
unpublished dispositions of this court.").
9. Id. 36(c)(2).
10. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on rehearingen banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000).
11. Id. at 899.
12. Id. at 904; see also Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 260 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (calling for review of the circuit's
"questionable practice of denying precedential status to unpublished opinions"). But see Hart v.
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159-80 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that issuance of non-precedential
opinions by appellate courts complies with Article Ill).
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This Article offers a case study examining one circuit's precedential
and non-precedential applications of one frequently invoked
constitutional theory, the "state-created danger" theory of substantive
due process. It compares the Third Circuit's divergent binding and nonprecedential opinions applying this theory over a seven-year period,
including the six-year interval between precedential decisions. The
comparison demonstrates that the risks of courts disposing of appeals by
non-precedential opinions are real.
This case study reveals that the doctrinal inconsistencies between the
Third Circuit's precedential and non-precedential state-created danger
opinions created a layer of hierarchical decision-making of uncertain
significance that is confusing to both litigants and trial courts. The
district courts' unpredictable application of the non-precedential
opinions undermined the appellate functions of ensuring that like cases
are treated alike, of ensuring that judicial decisions are predictable and
not arbitrary, and of ensuring that legal issues resolved at the appellate
level need not be relitigated before the district courts. While issuing nonprecedential opinions is often defended on efficiency grounds, 3
doctrinal inconsistency between a circuit's precedential and nonprecedential opinions undercuts that rationale because doctrinal
divergences may lead plaintiffs and defendants to value cases
differently-potentially leading to more litigation, fewer settlements,
and additional adjudication.
Part I of this Article explains the rationale for producing
"unpublished" federal appellate opinions that lack precedential value.
Part II explores the risks of generating such opinions, including doctrinal
divergence from precedent and uncertainty about how future courts and
litigants will value such opinions. Part III describes the prevalence of
non-precedential opinions in the Third Circuit's application of one
constitutional doctrine, state-created danger. Part IV identifies four
separate examples of doctrinal divergence between the circuit's
precedential and non-precedential applications of the doctrine. Part V
explains that applications of state-created danger frequently make law
because it is invoked in widely varying factual contexts. Finally, the
Conclusion proposes several reforms to promote uniformity between
precedential and non-precedential opinions within the same circuit.

13. See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
I.

THE RATIONALE FOR NON-PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS

Most Third Circuit decisions are not precedential. 14 During the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2004, the Third Circuit
disposed of 2047 appeals on the merits.15 Only 320 resulted in published
opinions, meaning 84.4% of1 6 the Third Circuit's dispositions on the
merits were non-precedential.
Such a huge percentage of non-precedential opinions is the norm for
federal appellate courts. The thirteen courts of appeals "have
cumulatively issued tens of thousands of non-precedential opinions, and
about 80% of the opinions... in recent years have been designated as
non-precedential." 1 7 According to one scholar, the federal appellate
14. Under the Third Circuit's Internal Operating Procedures, "not precedential opinions ...are
not regarded as precedents that bind the court because they do not circulate to the full court before
filing," 3D CIR. IOP 5.7, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf, unless the
opinion is not unanimous, id. lOP 5.5.4. A majority of the panel decides whether an opinion is
designated as precedential or not precedential. Id. IOP 5.1. The distinction between not precedential
and precedential is that the former "appears to have value only to the trial court or the parties," id.
lOP 5.3, and the latter "has precedential or institutional value," id. lOP 5.2.
15. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3

(2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Library" hyperlink; then follow "Statistical
Reports" hyperlink; then follow "Judicial Business of the United States Courts" hyperlink; then
follow "2004 Annual Report of the Director" hyperlink; then follow "S-3" hyperlink).
16. Id. The Annual Report concluded that of the 1727 unpublished opinions, all but thirty-eight
"expound[ed] on the law as applied to the facts" and "detail[ed] the judicial reasons upon which the
judgment [was] based," as opposed to simply disposing of the appeal without comment. Id. The
numbers and percentages of unpublished opinions are similar for the twelve-month periods ending
September 30, 2003, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/tables/s3.pdf (1915
appeals, 84.3% unpublished), September 30, 2002, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2002
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2002/tables/s03sep02.pdf (1965 appeals, 84.3% unpublished), September 30, 2001, see
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2001),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OOl/tables/sO3sepOl.pdf (1707 appeals, 85.2%
unpublished), September 30, 2000, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000 ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2000), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/tables/
s03sep00.pdf (1657 appeals, 83.6% unpublished), September 30, 1999, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S.

COURTS,

1999

ANNUAL

REPORT

OF

THE

DIRECTOR

tbl.S-3

(1999),

available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/s03sep99.pdf (1707 appeals, 81.0% unpublished), September
30, 1998, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-

3 (1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/sO3sep98.pdf (1740 appeals, 85.4%
unpublished), and September 30, 1997, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business/
s03sep97.pdf (1873 appeals, 83.9% unpublished).
17. Minutes of Fall 2002 Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules (Nov. 18, 2002),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/appll02.pdf;

see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,

JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.2.5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/
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courts began issuing non-precedential opinions about thirty years ago to
manage increasing caseloads,' 8 but "what began as an experiment has
become the dominant mode of case disposition for the federal appellate
courts."!

9

The practice of non-precedential decision-making assumes that
federal appellate opinions serve two main functions--dispute-settling
and lawmaking-and that only the latter should be precedential.2 °
Federal court scholars William Reynolds and William Richman
succinctly explained the underlying theory: "Law making opinions
announce new law, apply settled law to new facts, or include important
discussion or criticism of settled rules. Dispute-settling opinions apply
uncontroversial rules of law to ordinary cases and have no value to the
public."'
Judicial efficiency is the most commonly cited rationale for nonprecedential opinions.
The late Eighth Circuit Judge Richard S.
Arnold, the author of Anastasoff, was pragmatic about why the practice,
contents.html (follow "Type of Opinion or Order Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After
Oral Hearing or Submissions on the Briefs") (last visited Apr. 28, 2006) (showing that for all U.S.
Courts of Appeals, excluding Federal Circuit, the percent of unpublished opinions during 2000-05
ranges from a low of 79.8% in 2000 to a high of 81.6% in 2005); Lauren Robel, The Practice of
Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive
Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 402 (2002) (noting that publication rate varies among circuits but
is 23% overall).
18. Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: ProhibitingNon-PrecedentialOpinions
by Statute or ProceduralRule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 717 (2004) ("The modem history of the nonprecedential opinion beg[an] in 1964, when the Judicial Conference of the United States passed a
resolution [providing that federal courts] authorize the publication of only those opinions which are
of general precedential value." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). By 1974, each of
the federal circuits had adopted a non-publication rule. Id. at 718. A detailed history of the nonprecedential opinion can be found in William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The NonPrecedentialPrecedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168-72 (1978).
19. Sloan, supra note 18, at 719.
20. Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L.
REV. 3, 50.

21. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 808 (1979); see Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1182-83;
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracyand Scholarship, 21
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 623, 632-33 (1988).
22. E.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1290, 1293 (1996); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 21, at 623-24 (noting that
circuit courts adopted these strategies to deal with the "staggering increase in the[ir] work"); Robel,
supra note 20 ("Limited publication is a response to caseload; its rationale derives in part from the
hope that significant amounts of time can be saved by not preparing opinions for publication, but
simply preparing a statement suitable for the parties that explains the results of the appeal.").

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
which he considered unconstitutional, nevertheless took hold: "The
answer lies in one word, the same word that describes the most serious
problem facing all our courts today: volume. 23 Judge Arnold explained
that federal courts have adopted a variety of administrative strategies to
cope with increasing volume, "including more staff, with centrally
located staff attorneys; a smaller proportion of cases argued orally; less
time allotted to those cases that are argued; decisions by one-line order
or brief memorandum; and, of course, unpublished opinions., 24 As
federal court scholar Lauren Robel rightly observes, the federal judges'
varied and creative administrative remedies for the overwhelming
workload are themselves "testimony to [the judges'] dedication. 2 5
Preparing an opinion for publication costs appellate judges time.
Since non-precedential opinions are intended for use only by the parties
and the decision-maker whose opinion is under review, the appellate
panel can devote less time to eliminating potential ambiguity and to
explaining all arguments. 26 Yet, as one scholar points out, declining to
issue a precedential opinion does not eliminate the costs of researching
and reaching a reasoned decision, but is instead intended "to minimize
additional special production costs associated with publication ... [such
as] shor[ing] it up with citations to authority at every turn,
and... anticipat[ing] in writing possible criticisms of the opinion. 27
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, a vociferous opponent of
permitting citation of non-precedential opinions, argues that the volume
23. Richard S. Arnold, UnpublishedOpinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 221
(1999).
24. Id. at 222.
25. Robel, supra note 20, at 6; see also id. at 38 (reporting that 81% of federal appellate judges
surveyed reported workload is "overwhelming" or "heavy").
26. See Robel, supra note 20; Robel, supra note 17, at 403; see also Reynolds & Richman, supra
note 18, at 1183-84; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 21, at 633 (a non-precedential opinion "need
not contain a detailed recitation of the facts, a discussion of every legal issue raised by the parties,
or a scholarly review of the governing legal principles and authorities"); Howard Slavitt, Selling the
Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication,and Vacatur, 30 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 123-24 (1995).
27. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 942 (1989);

see Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1190-91; Robel, supra note 20, at 51; Slavitt, supra
note 26 (summarizing the efficiency rationale as "judges do not have enough time and resources to
analyze, research, and write each opinion to the extent necessary for it to become part of the system
of published law"). But see Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST.

L.J. 177, 190 (1999) (explaining that, as sitting Sixth Circuit Chief Judge, he spends less than half
as much time researching a typical unpublished opinion as a published opinion because legal
questions addressed in unpublished opinions tend to be straightforward and easily answered).
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of cases in that circuit affords the court time to do no more than ensure
that a law clerk's or staff attorney's draft reaches the right result and
adequately explains it to the parties.28
Non-precedential opinions often omit a detailed explanation of the
facts because their target audience is assumed to know the facts. 29 Nonprecedential opinions "typically are shorter... than published decisions,
and sometimes are written with less care and detail precisely because
they are solely for the use of the original parties to the lawsuit."3 ° In the
Third Circuit, however, this is not necessarily true. According to former
Chief Judge Edward R. Becker:
Most are not cursory; in fact they average over seven pages....
[T]hey uniformly set forth the ratio decidendi of the decision.
These opinions are prepared in chambers under the close
supervision of the judge. They are usually drafted by clerks but,
to repeat, carefully reviewed and edited by Judges. In my
chambers they are written by me ....
3l
Efficiently disposing of large appellate dockets is not the sole
justification for non-precedential opinions. By designating certain
decisions as non-precedential, federal appellate courts may devote more
resources to producing better precedential opinions.3 2 Sixth Circuit
Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., defends the practice as "a way to pan for
judicial gold while throwing the less influential opinions back in the
stream,, 33 "without adding to the clutter, and sometimes confusion, of
our multitudinous array of published decisions. ' '34 The Third Circuit's
28. Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to ProposedFederalRule of Appellate Procedure32.1, 51 FED.
LAW. 36, 38 (June 2004) ("[Many non-precedential dispositions are] drafted by the court's central
staff and presented to a panel of three judges in camera, with an average of five or 10 minutes
devoted to each case. During a two- or three-day monthly session, a panel of three judges may issue
100 to 150 such rulings."); id. (arguing that "the process of anticipating how the language... will
be read by future litigants and courts, and how small variations in wording might be imbued with
meanings never intended-takes exponentially more time and must be reserved, given our caseload,
to the cases we designate for publication"); see also Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please
Don't Cite This!, CAL. LAW. 43, 43-44 (June 2000); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 21, at 63334 (explaining that courts have limited the citation of non-precedential opinions in order to realize
time savings "without worrying that a careless word might later come back to haunt the court").
29. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1183; Slavitt, supra note 26.
30. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1, 46 (2004).
31. Becker, supra note 7, at 2 (emphasis in original).
32. Velamoor, supra note 5, at 563.
33. Martin, supra note 27, at 178.
34. Id. at 197; see also id. at 191 (noting that the practice is useful to prevent against "truly
meritorious cases [being] lost in a flood of opinions on minor issues").
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internal rules suggest a similar rationale. 35 These rules assume that the
authoring panel will be able to predict before writing an opinion which
decisions will have no value except to the parties and the trial court, and
anticipates non-precedential opinions even where the panel reverses or is
itself divided. 36
Even if the Third Circuit could produce timely precedential decisions
for the roughly two thousand appeals it disposes of annually,37 doing so
would not be optimal for judges or litigants.38 Not only would such a
volume of published opinions overtax the resources of the court, but the
published opinions likely would be repetitive. While not as significant a
concern in the age of online research, universal publication would
involve expensive sifting to locate cases that fleshed out the governing
doctrine itself or as it applied to a new set of facts, 39 and the time and
expense of cite-checking would increase. 4° However, while the

35. Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 5.3, "Not Precedential Opinions," provides in
relevant part that an opinion "that appears to have value only to the trial court or the parties is
designated as not precedential and is not printed as a slip opinion but, unless otherwise provided by
the court, it is posted on the court's internet website." 3D CIR. lOP 5.3, available at
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf. Former Internal Operating Procedure 5.3 was
substantially the same but did not provide for online publication of the non-precedential decisions.
See 3D CIR. lOP 5.3 (superseded 2002) (on file with author).
36. 3D CIR. lOP 5.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf (providing for
the issuance of not precedential opinions "without regard to whether the panel's decision is
unanimous and without regard to whether the panel affirms, reverses, or grants other relief').
37. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
38. See 3D CIR. lOP 5.5.3(a), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf
("aspirational goal" is circulation of a draft opinion within sixty days after assignment or after close
of any supplemental briefing).
39. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1184 (arguing that the costs of opinion
publication for lawyers include extra research time); Robel, supra note 27 (arguing that publication
increase would increase the cost of maintaining libraries); Slavitt, supra note 26, at 124-25 (noting
that the indirect benefits of non-precedential opinions include saving judges and litigants the effort
of sifting through needless repetitive decisions); Velamoor, supra note 5, at 563; cf Lawrence J.
Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An AppropriateExpedience or an Abdication of Responsibility?,
32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1215, 1220 (2004); Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology and
Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REv. 541, 559-61 (1997);
Memorandum from Stephen R. Barnett, Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor of Law, Emeritus, to
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 17-18 (Feb. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.nonpublication.com/bamettresponse321.pdf (arguing that any increase in research time
would be small because computer research hones in on relevant cases and few additional cases
would be retrieved).
40. One justification is less convincing: While non-precedential decisions permit the court to
allow issues to "percolate," Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the
Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 17, 24 n.28 (2000), that practice confers on circuit court panels
the discretionary docket power of the en bane or Supreme Court. William M. Richman & William
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justifications for non-precedential opinions are easy to grasp, their
proliferation also carries specific risks.
II.

THE RISKS OF GENERATING NON-PRECEDENTIAL
OPINIONS

Appellate court production of a body of non-precedential opinions
that are not binding on either subsequent appellate panels or on the
district courts, a "twilight zone of written-but-unpublished work, '" 1
creates a number of risks for courts and litigants, including: doctrinal
shifts from precedential decisions; uncertainty about the persuasive
value of non-binding decisions issued by the hierarchically superior
court; mistaken predictions of an opinion's future usefulness; and
unpredictability of judicial outcomes. There is a consequent risk of
litigant uncertainty about settlement value and litigation strategy,
including the initial decision to sue.
A.

DoctrinalAnomalies and Applications of Settled Law to New Facts

Adherence to precedent is a principal tool in ensuring that judicial
decision-making is predictable, uniform, rule-based, and fair to similarly
situated litigants. 42 Non-precedential resolution does not affect a
judgment's preclusive effect or alter the resolution of the parties'
dispute, and therefore serves the judicial goal of resolving private
disputes. But non-precedential dispositions have the potential to conflict
with the lawmaking function of judicial decision-making, either if they
diverge from the binding doctrine in precedential decisions,4 3 or if they
flesh out the meaning of a settled legal rule by applying it to a new
scenario. 44 The risk of doctrinal divergence in non-precedential opinions
underlies the specific publication criteria of the Sixth Circuit, which, for
example, favors publication when the opinion establishes a new rule of

L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand
Tradition,81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 283 (1996).

41. Robel, supra note 27, at 943.
42. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1987).
43. See Sara Hoffman Jurand, ProposedRule on Citing 'Unpublished' Opinions Takes First Step,
TRIAL, June 2004, at 70, 72 (not publishing decisions "'increases the risk of inconsistent decisionmaking, creates a perception that courts engage in results-oriented decision-making, and distorts and

impedes the development of the law'

(quoting Richard Frankel of Trial Lawyers for Public

Justice)); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1192-94.
44. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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law, alters or modifies an existing rule of law, applies an established rule
to a novel fact situation, or creates or resolves a conflict of authority. 5
Further, the assumption that dispute-settling opinions have no value to
the public may underestimate the value for future litigants and district
46
courts of examples of settled rules applied to diverse factual scenarios.
Professors Reynolds and Richman explain: "First, the weight of
precedent on a point of law hardens it, making it more difficult to
overturn.... Second, later cases help flesh out a precedent... [and]
fleshing out by application of principle to different facts is vital to
common-law adjudication. ' The second point deserves special
emphasis. For example, as another scholar argues: "In areas of law
where factual settings are diverse-due
care, bad faith,
unconscionability, reasonableness, duress, and proximate cause-which
is perhaps the bulk of law, the true content of law is known not by the
verbal rule formulations but by the application of those verbal
formulations.'4 8
The Third Circuit has a single criterion for determining whether its
opinions will be precedential or non-precedential: if the majority of a
panel predicts the decision will be valuable to others beyond the parties
and the trial court, then the decision is precedential. 4 9 This approach

45. 6TH CIR. R. 206, available at http://pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/rules/frame.htm. Many of the
circuit rules that provide specific criteria for publication appear based on the model guidelines for
opinion publication published by the Federal Judicial Center in the mid-1970s. See William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts
ofAppeals: The Priceof Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 578 (1981).
46. See Fox, supra note 39, at 1226 (stating that opinions that follow a new rule can be as
important to the development of law as the original opinion); Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note
30, at 45-46; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1196; Robel, supra note 20, at 53 (study of
government litigants showed use of non-precedential decisions to make litigation decisions and
write briefs); Robel, supra note 27, at 947 (criticizing the assumptions underlying limited
publication rules in part because "the central assumption, that only lawmaking and not disputeresolving opinions give litigants useful information, is wrong because it underestimates the varieties
of information that lawyers retrieve from opinions. Even if the courts select for publication only
those opinions that 'make law,' unpublished opinions contain useful information because opinions
tell lawyers more than simply 'what the law is."'); Robel, supra note 17, at 405-07 (finding
evidence that attorneys read non-precedential opinions for reasoning that might be persuasive in the
future); Slavitt, supra note 26, at 126.
47. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1190; see also id. at 1176.
48. Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 755, 768-69 (2003).
49. 3D CIR. lOP 5.1, 5.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf; supra
note 35.
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risks erroneous predications by the authoring panel. 50 As Professors
Reynolds and Richman hypothesize, "existence of inconsistency
between unpublished opinions and published law and among
unpublished opinions... constitutes evidence that judges cannot, at the
time of writing, correctly distinguish between lawmaking and disputesettling opinions. 51 More subtle is the risk that a court may overlook an
opportunity to create or modify precedent in an area that needs it
because "an early decision that a case does
not warrant a published
' 52
precedential opinion may be self-fulfilling.
Judicial production of mostly non-precedential opinions is more
efficient for litigants only if the non-precedential opinions are redundant
articulations of routine legal principles applied to routine facts.53 The
appellate court efficiency rationale for non-precedential decisions does
not accurately account for the reality confronted by litigants if the nonprecedential decisions (1) are doctrinally inconsistent with binding
precedent, or (2) apply law to a novel set of facts that gives new
meaning to the legal test. Similarly, the efficiency rationale for judicial
production of mostly non-precedential opinions is undercut for appellate
courts-or district courts-if inconsistencies between the precedential
and non-precedential decisions encourage more litigation or discourage
settlement. Because "[1lawyers use precedent to evaluate how courts
apply the law across a range of cases as much as to identify what a
precise rule of law is," one cost of the time-saving device of nonprecedential decision-making "is that it leaves the law unclear and may
ultimately lead to more litigation to clarify the law.",54 The efficiency
justification would be undercut if, for example, litigants make wrong

50. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1201 ("Even the best-intentioned and hardestworking court can make a mistake."); Robel, supra note 17, at 403 (noting that 30% of federal
appellate judges believed they "sometimes" had to forgo writing opinions for publication in cases in
which they "should be written"); Slavitt, supra note 26, at 125 ("[J]udges may not accurately
determine the value of decisions before writing them because writing tests the reasoning
process.... If an opinion 'won't write,' it alerts a judge that the rationale, the outcome, or both, are
wrong."). But see Martin, supra note 27, at 192 (arguing that the publication decision is "almost
invariably an easy call to make" and judges "seldom make mistakes").
51. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1193-94.
52. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 21, at 635.
53. See infra Part IV.
54. Slavitt, supra note 26, at 126; see Cappalli, supra note 48, at 770 (arguing that given the
number of non-precedential legal resolutions, "[i]t
is difficult to doubt that considerable numbers of
issues have been unnecessarily and inefficiently relitigated in both appellate and trial courts"); see
also Boggs & Brooks, supra note 40, at 20-22.
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choices about whether to bring or settle a suit because they wrongly
predict that a court will approve a claim55when non-precedential opinions
make the opposite outcome more likely.
Proponents of the efficiency rationale for judicial production of
mostly non-precedential opinions concede that judges may be less
rigorous in an unpublished analysis.56 While some assume doctrinal
uniformity,57 others in favor of a blanket prohibition on litigants' citing
unpublished opinions assume doctrinal inconsistencies between a
circuit's precedential and non-precedential opinions. 8 Such proponents
appear motivated by a desire to limit public attention to "actual or
apparent inconsistencies" by "forc[ing] such opinions out of sight" 59 to
avoid "increas[ing] public perception of judicial unpredictability and
reflect[ing] negatively on the administration of justice. 60
From the vantage of a sitting federal judge, the author of Anastasoff,
Judge Arnold, explained the risk that the option of issuing a nonprecedential opinion may tempt federal judges to sweep doctrinal
problems under the rug:
If, for example, a precedent is cited, and the other side then
offers a distinction, and the judges on the panel cannot think of a
good answer to the distinction, but nevertheless, for some
extraneous reason, wish to reject it, they can easily do so
through the device of an abbreviated, unpublished opinion, and
no one will ever be the wiser. (I don't say that judges are
actually doing this-only that the temptation exists.) Or if, after
hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain
decision should be reached, but also believes that the decision is
hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result,

55. See infra Part IV.
56. See Kozinski, supra note 28. Arguing against even permitting citation to a typical Ninth
Circuit non-precedential opinion, Judge Kozinski stated that such opinions function well as letters to
the litigants explaining the result, "even if every proposition of law is not stated with surgical
precision. But as a citable precedent, it's a time bomb... ; language that is lifted from a bench
memo and pasted wholesale into a disposition can provide a veritable gold mine of ambiguity and
misdirection." Id. See also Martin, supra note 27; Robel, supra note 27; Slavitt, supra note 26.
57. Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Martin's efficiency justification of unpublished opinions is
premised on the assumption of doctrinal uniformity: "Unpublished decisions tend to involve
straightforward points of law-if they did not, they would be published. These types of
cases ... involve settled law and variations on the facts." Martin, supranote 27.
58. See Velamoor, supra note 5, at 576.

59. Id.
60. Id.
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assuming agreement by the other members of the panel, by
deciding the case in an unpublished opinion and sweeping the
difficulties under the rug.... [A] system that encourages this
to
sort of behavior, or is at least open to it, has to be subject
61
question in any world in which judges are human beings.
In sum, the proliferation of non-precedential appellate opinions risks
divergence from binding doctrine, non-precedential applications of
settled law to new facts that flesh out the settled rule, and mistaken
predictions of an opinion's lack of value to the public.
B.

UncertaintyAbout How Appellate Panels and District Courts Will
Treat Non-PrecedentialOpinions

If the risk of producing opinions inconsistent with precedent is
realized, proliferation of opinions that do not bind future appellate
panels or district courts risks inconsistent treatment of the nonprecedential opinions by the courts responsible for applying the law of
that circuit. Specifically, if doctrinal inconsistencies exist, there is a
resulting risk of arbitrariness and unpredictability in district court
decision-making. This is true where, as in the Third Circuit currently and
under the proposed federal appellate rule, litigants and district courts
may cite non-precedential opinions,62 leaving the district courts
discretion to assess their persuasive value.6 3
It is easy to see why a district court would follow a non-precedential
decision. District court judges do not like to be reversed, for reasons of
both professional reputation 64 and judicial economy. A district court
61. Arnold, supra note 23, at 223; see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1200 ("A
court might also use the cloak of non-publication to avoid the task of reconciling arguably

inconsistent decisions.").
62. Third Circuit rules impose no restriction on litigant and district court citation of nonprecedential authority, see 3D CIR. lOP 5.7, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/lOPFinal.pdf (circuit "by tradition does not cite to its not precedential opinions as authority"), nor does
the proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1(a), Memorandum from Judge Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Report of Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules (Oct. 7,
2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rnles/Reports/AP 10-2005.pdf#page=2.

63. See Velamoor, supra note 5, at 575 (arguing for prohibition on citation of non-precedential
opinions to "reduce the inter- and intra-circuit disuniformity inherent in a regime in which it is left
to individual judges to decide whether unpublished opinions are legitimate sources of authority and

whether the reasoning contained in any given unpublished opinion is sufficiently sound to justify
reliance in a later case").
64. Reasons include: "(1) fear that their professional audience, including colleagues, practitioners,
and scholars, will disrespect their legal judgments or abilities; (2) fear that a high reversal rate might
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judge may consider an appellate court non-precedential decision akin to
dicta from the binding circuit, probative of future decision-making and
hence useful in crafting a decision likely to be affirmed.65 Despite the
circuit's designation of an opinion as non-precedential, it exists: real
litigants presented real facts to the appellate court and the court
evaluated them under the binding law. Even if the circuit did not
painstakingly select every word, two or three judges of the circuit signed
on to the result and presumably the reasoning 66 "[Ujnpublished opinions
are still opinions-providing insights into a court's reasoning and
suggesting to advocates the arguments that could win or lose a case. 67
Although Third Circuit Judge Becker, the former Chief Judge, disputes
that district court judges will mistake the meaning of "nonprecedential, ' 68 Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has identified the
potential for district court uncertainty about the persuasive weight of
non-precedential opinions as a key justification for that circuit's
prohibition of citation of non-precedential opinions, since "even
unpublished dispositions tend to be viewed with fear and awe, simply
because they, too, appear to have been written... by three circuit
judges. 6 9
While easy to grasp why a district court might follow a nonprecedential opinion from the binding circuit, other possible outcomes
exist. A district court might choose not to follow a non-precedential
decision. Or, a district court could choose not to follow a nonprecedential opinion but feel compelled to distinguish it. Finally, a
district court might refuse even to acknowledge a relevant nonprecedential opinion.
Similar uncertainty exists as to how a subsequent appellate panel will
reduce opportunities for professional recognition and advancement... ; and (3) the perception that
reversal undercuts their de facto judicial power, both in a tangible and intangible sense." Evan H.
Caminker,

Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court

Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994) (citations omitted); see Reynolds & Richman,
supra note 18, at 1196 & n. 152. In rarer instances, district court judges invite reversal. Caminker,
supra, at 79 & n.276.
65. For an explanation of how lower federal courts supplement binding precedent with reliance
on dicta, see Caminker, supra note 64, at 75-77.
66. See 3D CIR. lOP 5.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf.
67. Robel, supra note 27, at 943-44.
68. Becker, supra note 7, at 2.
69. Kozinski, supra note 28, at 37; see id. (dispositions bearing the names of three appellate
judges are different from other persuasive sources-like Shakespearian sonnets and advertising
jingles, which "are not, and cannot be mistaken for, expressions of the law of the circuit").
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assess the persuasive value of a non-precedential decision.7 ° Inconsistent
treatment of non-precedential opinions by courts purporting to apply the
binding law of the circuit therefore carries the same risks, whether at the
appellate or district court level. These risks include: relitigation of issues
already resolved at the appellate level and different treatment of like
cases, thus undermining the judicial values of uniformity, predictability,
and principled decision-making.
C.

UncertaintyAbout How Litigants Will Treat Non-Precedential
Opinions

Appellate opinions that do not bind subsequent panels or district
courts also risk inconsistent treatment by litigants bound by the law in
that circuit. For example, a litigant has incentive to rely on a nonprecedential opinion because of the possibility that a district court 72 or
circuit panel will follow the non-precedential reasoning.73 A litigant has
incentive to use non-precedential opinions not just because the facts may
be similar or the reasoning persuasive but also for "the added boost
74 of
reasoning.,
that
endorse
judges
appeals
of
court
three
that
claiming
If there are doctrinal inconsistencies between precedential and nonprecedential opinions, unpredictable application of non-precedential
opinions by subsequent appellate panels and by district courts may breed
uncertainty among attorneys as to how to advise their clients about
70. By tradition, the Third Circuit does not cite its own non-precedential opinions as authority, a
key difference between the Third Circuit and district courts within the Third Circuit. 3D CIR. lOP
5.7, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/RulesflOP-Final.pdf ("Such opinions are not regarded
as precedents that bind the court because they do not circulate to the full court before filing."); cf id.
IOP 5.5.4 (stating that drafts of not precedential opinions that are not unanimous do circulate to all
active judges).
71. See infra Part IV for adiscussion of how these risks have been realized in the Third Circuit.
72. See supra Part lI.B.
73. In the Third Circuit, the latter would be without citation. See supra note 70.
74. Kozinski, supra note 28, at 37; see also id. (ridiculing as naive the Advisory Committee
assertion that an opinion would be cited "for its 'persuasive value' ... [because] the party hopes that
it will influence the court as, say, a law review article might-that is, simply by virtue of the
thoroughness of its research or the persuasiveness of its reasoning"). A Seventh Circuit judge
articulated a litigant's reason for relying on non-precedential opinions as persuasive authority:
If the cited order is the work product of our court, if we must study the facts to see if they are
distinguishable from the case presently before us, if we must either follow the precise legal
formulation found in the order or explain why we are not doing so--in short, if (as is
itas a full-fledged precedential opinion of the court, then it is a fullinevitable) we must treat
fledged precedential opinion of the court.
Jurand,supra note 43 (quoting the Honorable Diane Wood, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit).
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bringing or settling claims. The basic theory of settlement "has long
been recognized: A rational party should settle only if it can obtain at
least what it would achieve by proceeding to trial and verdict, taking into
account all of the economic and noneconomic costs of both settlement
and trial.",75 A lawyer values a claim for settlement in part by predicting
the likely judicial resolution of the claim, 76 a process impeded by
doctrinal divergence between precedential and non-precedential
decisions. Thus, just as one district court may be persuaded by a nonprecedential opinion and a different district court may reject any reliance
on that decision, so too litigants may differently value non-precedential
opinions, reducing potential for settlement.77
Specifically in the context of Third Circuit state-created danger
claims, if the appellate court's non-precedential opinions interpret the
doctrine more narrowly than precedent, then issuing non-precedential
opinions may undermine judicial efficiency by encouraging litigation,
discouraging settlement, and causing issues resolved at the appellate
level to be relitigated in district courts.78
III.

THE PREVALENCE OF "UNPUBLISHED," NONPRECEDENTIAL THIRD CIRCUIT STATE-CREATED
DANGER DECISIONS

The state-created danger theory of substantive due process liability is
a frequently invoked constitutional theory litigated under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The theory is an exception to the general rule set forth by the
Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Departmentof Social
Services79 that a state is not constitutionally obligated to protect its
citizens from the violent acts of private persons. 80 Under the state75. Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. DISP.
at 4 ("A plaintiff, for example, should never accept
RESOL, 1, 3-4 (footnotes omitted); see also id.
less in settlement than what it estimates it would receive in the way of a verdict at trial, discounting
for the expected expenses of proceeding to trial and for any other anticipated economic, social,
psychological, and legal costs. Similarly, a defendant should not pay out in settlement any more
than what it expects to lose at trial, increased by the expense of trial and any other expected
economic and noneconomic costs that trial would entail.").
76. See Becker, supra note 7, at 4 (lawyers want non-precedential opinions for persuasive value
and evaluation for settlement).
77. See infra Parts IV.A.5, B.2, C.4, D.3.
78. See infra Part IV for a summary of how these risks have been realized.
79. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
80. Id. at 195.
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created danger exception, state actors may be held liable for private
violence when the state actors create the risk of the privately inflicted
harm. 81 State-created danger claims are litigated in a wide variety of
factual contexts. For example, claims may be brought against state actors
such as police, public school officials, emergency medical technicians,
or security guards for increasing the risk of harm suffered by a plaintiff,
even though the state actors did not themselves inflict the harm.82 While
the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the validity of the statecreated danger theory,83 this exception to the general rule of DeShaney is
now widely accepted
by the federal courts as establishing a substantive
84
due process claim.
Since 1996, when the Third Circuit first adopted the state-created
danger theory, 85 district courts within the circuit have issued more than
eighty state-created danger decisions. 86 Despite such volume in the
district courts, the Third Circuit itself published only one precedential
state-created danger decision in the seven-year period following its
adoption of the state-created danger theory.8 7 A single precedent in
seven years does not reflect the total number of Third Circuit
dispositions of state-created danger appeals between 1996 and 2003.
81. See infra notes 83-87; infra note 89 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 84-87; infra note 89 and accompanying text.
83. The state-created danger exception to DeShaney's broad rule may become more significant
since the Supreme Court's 2005 rejection of an attempt to circumvent DeShaney on a theory other
than state-created danger. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2796
(June 27, 2005).
84. See, e.g., Jones v. Union County, Tenn., 296 F.3d 417, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2002); Martin v.
Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 708-12 (7th Cir. 2002); Butera v. District of
Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 649 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (canvassing circuits); see also McLendon v.
City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 330-32 (5th Cir. 2002) (canvassing circuits); cf id. at 334 (Parker,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit for "never explicitly rejecting or adopting" the statecreated danger theory).
85. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir. 1996).
86. See, e.g., DiJoseph v. City of Philadelphia, 953 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affid, 156 F.3d
1224 (3d Cir. 1998); Tazioly v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 97-CV-1219, 1998 WL 633747
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998); Gonzalez v. Angelilli, 40 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618-21 (E.D. Pa. 1999);
Sciotto v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist., No. CIV. A. 98-2768, 1999 WL 972011 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22,
1999); Hansell v. City of Atlantic City, 152 F. Supp. 2d 589 (D.N.J. 2001), aJfd,46 F. App'x 665
(3d Cir. 2002); Pokalsky v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. CIV. 02-323, 2002 WL 1998175 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2002); Tittensor v. County of Montgomery, No. Civ. A. 02-CV-8011, 2003 WL 22358450
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2003); Hillard v. Lampeter-Strasburg Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A. 03-2198, 2004 WL
1091050 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2004); Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311 (M.D. Pa.
2004); Deemer v. County of Chester, No. Civ. A. 03-6536, 2005 WL 182719 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25,
2005).
87. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997).

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
That number is likely known only by the Circuit itself, since the Third
Circuit's non-precedential opinions issued before January 2002 were not
released to West or Lexis and are not searchable in electronic form. An
informal survey of Third Circuit opinions reveals that in the fifty-three
months from July 1998 to December 2002 alone, the Third Circuit
issued at least thirteen non-precedential opinions addressing statecreated danger claims. 89 Despite evidence that state-created danger is a
frequently litigated constitutional doctrine invoked in a wide variety of
factual settings, and despite at least thirteen opportunities to do
otherwise, the Third Circuit declined to issue any precedent on the
doctrine for the six years between 1997 and 2003.
IV. THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN PUBLISHED BINDING
PRECEDENT AND "UNPUBLISHED," NON-PRECEDENTIAL
THIRD CIRCUIT STATE-CREATED DANGER OPINIONS:
FOUR EXAMPLES
This Part compares the divergent binding and non-precedential
opinions applying the state-created danger doctrine within the Third
Circuit. The comparison demonstrates that the risks of non-precedential
88. Barriers to researching pre-2002 non-precedential decisions are formidable. They generally
are not available in electronic form but exist only in hard copy from archived court files or directly
from a litigant. See supra note 7. To obtain certain decisions discussed here, over a period of several
weeks my research assistant first tried unsuccessfully to obtain them from counsel of record, then
repeatedly telephoned the Third Circuit Clerk's Office to schedule an appointment at the archive,
then traveled to a warehouse in Pennsylvania to photocopy the opinions, one of which had been
misplaced.
89. See Curtis v. McHenry, No. 97-3673 (3d Cir. July 29, 1998) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (on file with author); Solum v. Yerusalim, No. 99-1607 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2000)
(unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author); Estate of Burke v. Mahanoy City, No. 991357 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author); Estate of
Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-1579 (3d Cir. May 2, 2000) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (on file with author); O'Delli v. N. Belle Vernon Borough, No. 99-3654 (3d Cir. July
6, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author); Bumpess v. Phila. Hous. Auth.,
No. 99-1730 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author);
Marcolongo v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 99-2015 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2001) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (on file with author); Cannon v. Beal, No. 00-1208 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2001)
(unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author); Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Nos. 991980, 00-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2001) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author);
Pahler v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 31 F. App'x 69 (3d Cir. 2002); Combs v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 32 F.
App'x 653 (3d Cir. 2002); Jordan v. Houstoun, 39 F. App'x 795 (3d Cir. 2002); Hansell v. City of
Atlantic City, 46 F. App'x 665 (3d Cir. 2002). As an appellate attorney for the Philadelphia Law
Department, the author supervised the Philadelphia appellees' briefs in Henderson and Cannon, and
drafted the appellees' brief in Webb, but had left the Law Department by the date of the Webb Third
Circuit oral argument.
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opinions are real. During the six-year interval between binding statecreated danger decisions, the Third Circuit created inconsistent nonprecedential opinions on the identical legal theory. This Part examines
the following four doctrinal divergences in Third Circuit precedential
and non-precedential state-created danger decisions: (1) inconsistent
mental culpability standards; (2) inconsistent analysis of derivative
claims by family members; (3) inconsistent state action requirements;
and (4) inconsistent municipal liability standards.
A.

Example One: State ofMind Requirement

If non-precedential opinions simply apply established law, then the
mental culpability standards applied in the Third Circuit's precedential
and non-precedential state-created danger decisions should be identical.
They are not. Rather, non-precedential opinions recognized a Supreme
Court-mandated doctrinal shift in the state of mind requirement for statecreated danger9 ° years before Third Circuit precedent did. 9 1 The nonprecedential opinions issued between the Third Circuit's precedential
decisions-that is, between 1997 and 2003--demonstrate that this was a
confused area of the law, where Third Circuit judges were struggling to
articulate the doctrinal ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in
County of Sacramento v. Lewis92 for the Third Circuit state-created
danger test. Further, since 2003, the Third Circuit precedential statecreated danger decisions reveal ongoing doctrinal disagreement about
"the vexing problem" 93 of the correct mental culpability standard in "this
elusive area of the law, 94 suggesting that this doctrine even now
remains insufficiently settled for routine application. Finally, the Third
Circuit's refusal until 2003 to grapple in a precedential opinion with the
doctrinal implications of the Supreme Court's Lewis decision 95 left
district courts and litigants uncertain about the binding law, which likely
encouraged litigation and discouraged settlement.96

90. See infra Part IV.A.3.
91. See infra Part IV.A.4.
92. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
93. Brown v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318
F.3d 473, 479 (3d Cir. 2003).
94. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2003).
95. See infra Part IV.A.4.
96. See infra Part IV.A.5.

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
1.

Under the Third Circuit'sPre-Lewis Precedent,the State of Mind
Requirementfor a State-CreatedDangerClaim Was "Willful
Disregard/DeliberateIndifference"

Before the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis, Third Circuit
precedent permitted government actors to be held liable for creating a
danger if they "willfully disregarded" the safety of the plaintiff. In
Kneipp v. Tedder,97 the Third Circuit adopted the state-created danger
theory and applied a four-part test:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;
(2) the state actor acted in willful disregardfor the safety of the
plaintiff;
(3) there existed some relationship between the state and the
plaintiff, and
(4) the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity
would not have existed for the third party's crime
that otherwise
98
to occur.
The Third Circuit adopted a single fault standard for all state-created
danger claims-"willful disregard," which it equated with "deliberate
indifference" 99-and specifically rejected the "shocks the conscience"
standard. 00 In the seven years between the adoption of the theory (in
1996) and 2003, the Third Circuit issued only one state-created danger
precedent.' 0 ' That opinion applied the "willful disregard for the safety of
97. 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).
98. Id. at 1208 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995) (first
articulating the test)) (emphasis added).
99. The Third Circuit appeared to equate willful disregard/deliberate indifference with "reckless
indifference," "gross negligence," or "reckless disregard" as those terms had been used in the
context of substantive due process violations. Id. at 1208 n.21. It has since interpreted its statecreated danger precedent to have equated willful disregard and deliberate indifference. See, e.g.,
Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 65 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (Kneipp mental culpability
standard was "deliberate indifference"). Although the author's name appears as co-counsel for the
City of Philadelphia appellants in Ziccardi,the author had left the Philadelphia Law Department by
the time the appeal was briefed and argued.
100. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1207-08 ("[T]he... shocks the conscience standard is limited to police
pursuit cases, and accordingly, we are not bound to follow that standard in the case before us.")
(citing Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir.1994)). The Third Circuit has employed the
"shocks the conscience" standard in other high speed police car chases since Kneipp rejected it as a
general standard for state-created danger cases. See, e.g., United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200,
206 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Kneipp for view that the "shocks the conscience standard is limited to
police pursuit cases").
101. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 908 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Kneipp,
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The Supreme Court Subsequently Held that All Substantive Due
Process Claims Must Shock the Conscience

After the Third Circuit adopted the state-created danger theory in
1996, the Supreme Court announced a new analytic framework to
determine the mental culpability standard for all substantive due process
claims arising from executive action, of which state-created danger is a
subset. In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that the threshold question is
what fault standard along the continuum from deliberate indifference to
intent to harm will "shock the conscience": "[T]he cognizable 0level
of
3
conscience."',
the
shocks
which
that
[is]
power
of
executive abuse
"Shocks the conscience" is a not a single standard. Rather, it
encompasses a spectrum of fault from more than negligence 0 4 to intent
to harm. 10 5 According to the Supreme Court, whether fault will be
conscience-shocking in the "middle range, following from something
more than negligence but 'less than intentional conduct,"" 10 6 depends
upon the factual context, including (1) whether the state actor has time to
deliberate and (2) whether the state actor must weigh interests that
compete with the plaintiff's. 10 7 More culpability is required to shock the
conscience if the state actor was acting in a pressurized situation, with

95 F.3d at 1211).
102. Id. (quoting Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208). As recently as 2002, in a substantive due process
decision outside of the state-created danger context, the Third Circuit referred to the state-of-mind
requirement in the state-created danger context as "deliberate indifference." Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 66
n.6. Yet by noting that its state-created danger test "preceded Lewis," the court hinted that the
Supreme Court's decision in Lewis might have altered the state-created danger doctrine, just as it
had altered all substantive due process claims arising from executive action. Id. at 65 n.5 ("In
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996), which preceded Lewis, we held that deliberate
indifference sufficed in a case in which state actors placed the plaintiff in a dangerous situation and
the plaintiff was harmed by a nongovernmental actor.").
103. County of Sacramento v.Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
104. Negligence would not shock the conscience, and no liability would attach at that extreme of
the fault spectrum. Id. at 849 ("[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process." (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986))).
105. At the other extreme of the fault spectrum, the conduct of a state actor who "intended to
injure in some way unjustifiable by any governmental interest" would most likely shock the
conscience. Id.
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id.at 849-53.
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little time for reflection, 10 8 or if the state actor was balancing competing
legitimate interests-such as a pursuing police officer's balancing of the
risks of the chase against the risks of permitting the suspect to escape.109
The Supreme Court recognized that it had held "deliberate indifference"
to shock the conscience only in the context of medical care for prisoners,
where the state actors had "the luxury" of "time to make unhurried
judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely
uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations."11 0
3.

DivergenceBetween Precedentialand Non-PrecedentialThird
CircuitState-CreatedDanger State of Mind Requirements Between
1997 and 2003

The Third Circuit entered no precedential state-created danger
decisions between 1997 and 2003. During those years, while the
Circuit's precedents required only "willful disregard" and expressly
rejected the "shocks the conscience" standard, several Third Circuit
panels issued non-precedential opinions either casting doubt on the
continued doctrinal viability of the Third Circuit's state-of-mind
requirement"' or explicitly holding that aspect of its doctrine to have
108. Id. at 852-53.
109. Id. at 850-54.
110. Id. at 853. The breadth of the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis was clarified by the Third
Circuit's application of the Lewis "shocks the conscience" analytic framework to substantive due
process claims outside of the police chase context. See, e.g., Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288
F.3d 57, 66 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that paramedics' conduct must shock the conscience, meaning
that they "consciously disregarded, not just a substantial risk, but a great risk that serious harm
would result"); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806-08 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (analogizing foster
care to institutionalization and recognizing that a social worker had time to make unhurried
judgments, and holding that deliberate indifference could shock the conscience); Miller v. City of
Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a social worker must have
exhibited "gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed 'shocks the conscience"'; the author briefed
and argued Miller on behalf of municipal defendants).
11. See Burke v. Mahanoy City, No. 99-1357, at 8 n.6 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (unpublished and
non-precedential) (on file with author) (noting that Lewis "may suggest" that the mental culpability
prong of Third Circuit precedent "be modified," but declining to decide what higher level of fault
would now be required by the Lewis "shock the conscience" spectrum since the facts did not even
rise to the level of the binding "willful disregard" standard); Estate of Henderson v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 99-1579, at 12 (3d Cir. May 2, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file
with author) (refusing to decide the doctrinal ramifications of Lewis yet acknowledging that (1) the
Third Circuit already had recognized the Lewis "shock the conscience" framework controlled a
substantive due process claim outside of the police pursuit context; and (2) other federal circuits had
updated their state-created danger doctrines to apply the Lewis "shock the conscience" standard); id.
("In light of Lewis and the burgeoning number of state created danger cases, the City urges us to
refine the second Kneipp prong to make liability turn on a showing of deliberate indifference (or
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been narrowed by the intervening Supreme Court endorsement of the
"shocks the conscience" analytic framework for all substantive due
process claims. 11 2 Inexplicably, the Third Circuit twice chose nonprecedential decisions to announce this change in state-created danger
doctrine, bypassing the opportunity to clarify the doctrinal confusion.' 13
Meanwhile, compounding the doctrinal confusion, other Third Circuit
non-precedential
opinions
applied
the
binding
"willful
disregard/deliberate indifference" standard, but without wrestling with
Lewis's threshold inquiry into what fault level would "shock the
conscience," or with Lewis's acknowledgment that courts had held
"deliberate indifference" to violate substantive due process only where
willful disregard) that shocks the conscience. Because plaintiff cannot satisfy [a different aspect of
the Third Circuit state-created danger doctrine], we need not reach this issue even though we are
cognizant of support for such a position in our case law and that of other Courts of Appeals.").
There may be other state-created danger decisions similarly recognizing this doctrinal shift before
2002 but because the Third Circuit's non-precedential decisions before 2002 are not searchable in
electronic form, the obstacles to researching these decisions are great. See supranote 88.
112. See Cannon v. Beal, No. 00-1208, at 5-6 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2001) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (on file with author) (quoting the binding willful disregard standard but approving the
trial court's recognition that the Supreme Court's "shock the conscience" standard had superseded
the Third Circuit state-created danger doctrine three years before); id. ("Given the requirement of
Lewis that the actions of the state actor must 'shock the conscience' in order to trigger § 1983
liability... the District Court correctly concluded that if [plaintiff] is to prevail on the [state-ofmind] prong of the Kneipp analysis, she must prove that the defendant police officers' actions shock
the conscience.... [W]e find no error in the District Court's application of Kneipp, as modified by
Lewis. As the District Court observed, the police officers in this case were acting in a situation so
pressured as to inhibit their ability to act in a deliberate fashion: a large-scale manhunt for an armed
suspect (entailing the additional activities of securing the crime scenes, locating and interviewing
witnesses and collecting evidence) who had caused a serious multi-vehicle road accident, fled the
police, shot an officer, and invaded at least one private residence. Evaluating the effect of such
chaotic circumstances in light of ...Lewis and Miller v. City of Philadelphia,174 F.3d 368 (3d Cir.
1999), we cannot conclude that the police officers' failure immediately to transport [plaintiff] to the
hospital, while arguably negligent, rose to the requisite level of culpability under § 1983 and
Kneipp: an action or omission 'so ill-conceived or malicious that it "shocks the conscience."'
Miller, 174 F.3d at 375, quoting Lewis, 118 S.Ct. at 1717."); Pahler v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 31 F.
App'x 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2002) (reasoning that the Lewis "shock the conscience" standard govemed all
substantive due process claims and that which level of culpability will shock the judicial conscience
will vary depending on the factual context); id. ("We held in Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174
F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999), that Lewis requires a court, in all substantive due process cases, to
determine if the state actor's behavior shocks the conscience. The precise degree of wrongfulness to
reach the 'conscience-shocking' level depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. In this
case, the District Court held that the second factor of the [state-created danger] test has been
modified by the 'shock the conscience' standard, and what rises to that level will ultimately depend
on the factual scenario of the case at hand. We agree. Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to recover
under a 'state-created danger' theory must show that the actor acted with a willful disregard for or
deliberate indifference to plaintiffs safety that rises to the level of shocking the conscience.").
113. Cannon, No. 00-1208, at 5-6; Pahler,31 F. App'x at 71.
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there is an opportunity to deliberate and an absence 14of competing
interests-in the custodial context of prison medical care.'
4.

PrecedentialAcknowledgement that Lewis Changed the StateCreatedDangerDoctrine

The Third Circuit broke its years of precedential silence on the statecreated danger doctrine by issuing three precedential decisions in a
single month of 2003."' While the different opinions did not speak in
unison about the ramifications of Lewis for state-created danger analysis,
all three precedents agreed that the Third Circuit's doctrine had been
superseded by the Supreme Court's Lewis decision five years earlierthe doctrinal shift first articulated in non-precedential opinions at least as
early as 2001.116 The first precedent clarified "the vexing problem" of
"the appropriate lens through which we must view actions in the statecreated danger context"' 1 7 by establishing that the Lewis "shocks the
conscience" standard governed a claim against emergency medical

114. See Hansell v. City of Atlantic City, 46 F. App'x 665, 666-67 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
"willful disregard," despite a litigant's argument that Lewis required a higher standard, but
disposing of the appeal on a different prong of state-created danger test); Webb v. City of
Philadelphia, Nos. 99-1980, 00-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2001) (unpublished and non-precedential)
(on file with author) (quoting and applying "willful disregard," which it used "interchangeably"
with "deliberate indifference); Solum v. Yerusalim, No. 99-1607 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2000)
(unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author) (quoting and applying "willful disregard,"
which it equated with deliberate indifference); see also Jordan v. Houstoun, 39 F. App'x 795, 797
(3d Cir. 2002) (affirming for the reasons stated by the district court, which had applied a "willful
disregard" standard); Marcolongo v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 99-2015 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2001)
(unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author) (affirming the "thorough analysis" of the
district court, which had applied "willful disregard" and equated it with "deliberate indifference");
Bumpess v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 99-1730 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (on file with author) (affirming jury verdict where the jury had been instructed to
apply "willful disregard" or "deliberate indifference" and plaintiff objected to the trial court's
definition of those terms).
115. See Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 417 (3d Cir. 2003); Estate of Smith v.
Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2003); Brown v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Health
Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 480 (3d Cir. 2003).
116. See Cannon v. Beal, No. 00-1208 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2001) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (on file with author).
117. Brown, 318 F.3d at 479. The panel originally issued an opinion in 2002. Brown v.
Commonwealth of Penn. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 300 F.3d 310 (3d
Cir. 2002). In a single sentence, that decision recognized that the Lewis shocks the conscience
standard governed but did not discuss what that standard would mean, and the result turned on a
different prong of the four-prong state-created danger test. The panel later vacated the 2002 opinion
and granted panel rehearing, resulting in the 2003 decision that focused on the implications of
Lewis.
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technicians. 18 In a second precedent, the Third Circuit again recognized
the doctrinal shift "in this elusive area of the law" mandated by the
Supreme Court in Lewis five years earlier, 1 9 by clarifying that the Third
Circuit already had read the shocks the conscience framework both (1)
to encompass degrees of wrongfulness ranging from deliberate
120
indifference to intent to harm, depending on the factual circumstances,
and (2) to be the framework for all substantive due process cases arising
from executive action. 121
Within weeks, the Third Circuit issued a third precedential opinion,
again recognizing what the non-precedential opinions had articulated
years earlier: "[O]ur summary of the law regarding state created dangers
in [1996] needs to be updated to reflect the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in [Lewis].'' 122 In a one-judge opinion with a concurrence in the
judgment, Judge Walter K. Stapleton fleshed out the doctrinal shifts
already suggested in non-precedential opinions:
118. Brown, 318 F.3d at 475-77. Unfortunately, rather than reading the Lewis "shocks the
conscience" framework to encompass a range of conduct from deliberate indifference to intent, with
the conscience-shocking level to be dependent on the existence of competing legitimate interests
and the opportunity for deliberation, Brown misread Lewis to limit the shocks the conscience
standard to situations where the state actor must act quickly and without the chance to deliberate.
See id. at 480. Brown essentially read the "shocks the conscience" standard to mean a single
standard of mid-level fault, "'at least something more than subjective deliberate indifference in
circumstances requiring somewhat urgent state action."' Id. (quoting Ziccardi v. City of
Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2002)).
119. Smith, 318 F.3d at 509; see also id. at 507 (acknowledging that "recent cases have refined
certain elements" of the Third Circuit's state-created danger doctrine).
120. Id. at 508.
121. Id at 507. Smith, however, held that the fault standard for state-created danger claims should
be derived by evaluating whether the defendant had time and opportunity to deliberate, a
formulation that leaves out the Supreme Court's additional factor of whether the state actor was
confronted by competing legitimate interests (such as a prison guard weighing both the safety of
inmate rioters and that of other inmates when restoring order during a riot). See id. at 508-09;
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1998) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 320 (1986)). Smith is equivocal on the relevance of competing legitimate interests. It
summarized the mental culpability analysis required by Lewis in the state-created danger arena as
follows:
We think based on our reading of the precedents in this elusive area of the law that, except in
those cases involving either true split-second decisions or, on the other end of the spectrum,
those in which officials have the luxury of relaxed deliberation, an official's conduct may
create state-created danger liability if it exhibits a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that
shocks the conscience.
Smith, 318 F.3d at 509. However, Judge Morton I. Greenberg's opinion alluded to the existence of
legitimate interests competing with the plaintiff's safety by recognizing that the highest level of
fault, intent to cause harm, would not apply in the barricaded gunman situation confronting police in
Smith in part because "police had no reason to be concerned about the safety of third parties." Id.
122. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 417 (3d Cir. 2003).
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(1) the Lewis "shocks the conscience" analytic framework
applies to all substantive due process claims involving executive

action, "and we must, of course, apply it" to state-created
danger; 123

(2) shocks the conscience is not a single standard but describes a
range of conduct from deliberate indifference to intent to harm,
depending on the factual context; 24 and
(3) five years earlier, Lewis's shocks the conscience analytic
method had superseded the Third Circuit's blanket
willful
125

disregard standard for state-created danger claims.

123. Id. ("Since Lewis, we have had occasion to apply this substantive due process standard in a
number of different settings and we must, of course, apply it here."); id. ("[T]o prove a violation of
substantive due process in cases involving executive action, the plaintiff must show that the state
acted in a manner that 'shocks the conscience."' (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846)).
124. Id. ("Whether executive action is conscience shocking and thus 'arbitrary in the
constitutional sense' ... depends upon the particular circumstances that confront those acting on the
state's behalf.").
125. Id. at 418 ("with the guidance of Lewis and its progeny, I will undertake the required 'exact
analysis of [the] circumstances' facing the state actors to determine the appropriate culpability
level); id. at 419 ("There are several lessons from Lewis that are relevant here. The first, of course,
is that negligence is not enough to shock the conscience under any circumstances. The second is that
more culpability is required to shock the conscience to the extent that state actors are required to act
promptly and under pressure. Moreover, the same is true to the extent the responsibilities of the
state actors require a judgment between competing, legitimate interests."). Unlike the Third
Circuit's two precedents issued just weeks before, Judge Stapleton's opinion correctly read the
Supreme Court in Lewis to require a higher culpability standard both when the state actor must act
in haste and under pressure and also when the state actor must "judg[e] between competing,
legitimate interests." Id.; ef Brown v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med.
Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 480 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he 'shocks the conscience' standard
should apply in all substantive due process cases if the state actor had to act with urgency."); Smith,
318 F.3d at 509.
The Third Circuit again unmistakably accepted in 2004 that "recent cases [had] refined" the
mental culpability standard for state-created danger liability to require conduct that shocked the
conscience, a variable standard depending upon the factual situation. See Rivas v. City of Passaic,
365 F.3d 181, 194-96 (3d Cir. 2004) (referring to Lewis and its Third Circuit precedential progeny).
But the concurrence more clearly explained the breadth of the Lewis holding and its doctrinal
consequences for state-created danger, including overruling the Circuit's mental culpability
standard. Id. at 202-04 (Ambro, J., concurring in the judgment against emergency medical
technicians). The concurrence chastised the district court for relying on binding Third Circuit statecreated danger doctrine because "[iun so doing, it cited principles that have since been refined, if not
superseded altogether," id. at 202 (criticizing the district court's reliance on Kneipp), and criticized
the majority for "continuing to cite the Kneipp test as 'good law,' [because that] minimizes the
extent to which the law of state-created danger in our Circuit has changed," id. See Bright v.
Westmoreland County, No. 05-2005, _
F.3d __ (3d. Cir. Apr. 4, 2006), slip op. at 12 (holding
the mental culpability standard for state-created danger to be "a state actor acted with a degree of
culpability that shocks the conscience"); see also id. at 29 n.9 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (noting that
"[riecently, Judge Ambro accurately charted modifications to our test, leading him to question the

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:217, 2006

Even though the fault standard was not dispositive, Judge Stapleton
sought to guide future courts and litigants by carefully explaining the
analytical method Lewis prescribed to determine the applicable fault
standard. 126 That thoughtful guidance could have been undertaken three
years earlier by at least two Third Circuit panels which similarly had
found the precise fault standard not dispositive, but chose to issue nonprecedential opinions, thus perpetuating the doctrinal ambiguity.' 27
5.

PracticalConsequences of DoctrinalInconsistencyfor District
Courts and Litigants

The Third Circuit's belated precedential adherence to Supreme Court
doctrine is inconsistent with the appellate function. 28 The Third
Circuit's refusal until 2003 to wrestle in precedent with the doctrinal
ramifications of Lewis on state-created danger left district courts and
litigants within the Third Circuit uncertain as to whether the single
"willful disregard" standard had survived the Supreme Court's 1998
endorsement of the shocks the conscience spectrum-of-fault framework.
Many district courts concluded that the Lewis "shocks the conscience"
standard superseded Third Circuit precedent. 129 One relied on the Third

appropriateness of continuing to refer to the Deshaney exception as the Kneipp test"). While beyond
the scope of this Article, it is troubling that even after the precedential recognition that the Third
Circuit's state-created danger test had been altered by intervening Supreme Court precedent, some
Third Circuit non-precedential opinions continued to quote to the superseded "willful disregard"
mental culpability standard. See, e.g., Buchholz v. Midwestern Intermediate Unit IV, 128 F. App'x
890, 894 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting but not applying "willful disregard"); Liedy v. Borough of
Glenolden, 117 F. App'x 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Green v. City of Philadelphia, 92 F.
App'x 873, 875 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).
126. See Schieber, 320 F.3d at 418-21. That is, Judge Stapleton did not reach whether the fault
standard applicable to the police response to a 911 call in that case was the highest level (intent to
harm) or was the intermediate level ("subjectively apprecia[ting] and consciously ignor[ing] a great,
i.e., more than substantial, risk" that serious harm would result from defendant's conduct) because
the police conduct did not meet the even lower level of subjective deliberate indifference as it was
no more than negligent. Id. at 422-23.
127. See Burke v. Mahanoy City, No. 99-1357, at 8-9 n.6 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (unpublished
and non-precedential) (on file with author); Estate of Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 991579, at 12 (3d Cir. May 2, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author). There
may well have been additional state-created danger opinions decided post-Lewis and issued before
January 1, 2002. See supra notes 7, 88 (describing the difficulty of researching pre-2002 Third
Circuit non-precedential decisions).
128. See supra Introduction, Part 11and sources cited therein.
129. See Hansberry v. City of Philadelphia, 232 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410-11 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Estate
of Smith v. Marasco, 227 F. Supp. 2d 322, 354-55 (E.D. Pa. 2002), affd in part and rev'd in part,
318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003); Grazier v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.A. 98-CV-6063, 2001 WL

246
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Circuit's non-precedential endorsement of "shocks the conscience" as
"not entitled to precedential effect" but "instructive." 130 Another district
court emphasized the importance of resolving the doctrinal implications
of Lewis. 131 Despite that evidence of a need for appellate guidance, the
Third Circuit nevertheless chose to affirm the district court's judgment
in a non-precedential opinion-an appellate opinion that purported to
alter binding law.1 32 Even after the Third Circuit's two non-precedential
opinions purporting to update the state-of-mind requirement to "shocks
the conscience" 133--decisions that certainly should have been
precedential-district courts were not sure whether to follow the "willful
disregard" standard of Third Circuit precedent, as some did, 134 or instead
135
apply a standard different from Circuit precedent as others did.
Doctrinal divergence between precedential and non-precedential
decisions undermined the predictive value of precedent, resulting in
litigant uncertainty about litigation strategy and settlement value. For

1168093, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2001); Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 156 F. Supp. 2d 451,
458-59 (E.D. Pa. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 320 F.3d 409 (3d Cir. 2003); Roberson v. City of
Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 99-3574, 2001 WL 210294, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2001); White v.
City of Philadelphia, 118 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Combs v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No.
CIV.A.99-3812, 2000 WL 1611061, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2000); Robert S. v. City of
Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 97-6710, 2000 WL 341565, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2000).
130. Brozusky ex rel. Brozusky v. Hanover Twp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
131. See Cannon v. City of Philadelphia, 86 F. Supp. 2d 460, 469-70 (E.D. Pa. 2000), aff'd, No.
00-1208 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2001) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author). The
district court reasoned that the intervening Supreme Court precedent had overridden the Third
Circuit's limitation of the "shocks the conscience" standard to the police pursuit context; that
"because state-created danger is a subset of substantive due process, Lewis and Miller require that,
in a state-created danger case, the actions of the state actor must shock the conscience to trigger
liability"; and that, depending on the circumstances, a state of mind less egregious than intent to
injure could shock the conscience. Id.
132. See Cannon v. Beal, No. 00-1208, at 5-6 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2001) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (on file with author).
133. Id. at 5-6; Pahler v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 31 F. App'x 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2002).
134. See Petrone v. Pike County Prob. Dep't, 240 F. Supp. 2d 317, 321 (M.D. Pa. 2002); Dimitris
v. Lancaster County Prison Bd., 2002 WL 32348283, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2002); Leuallen v.
Paulsboro Police Dep't, 2001 WL 1700432, at *18 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2001); Hansell v. City of
Atlantic City, 152 F. Supp. 2d 589, 604-06 (D.N.J. 2001), aff'd46 F. App'x 665 (3d Cir. 2002).
135. See Hansberry v. City of Philadelphia, 232 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410-11 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
Brozusky, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 613; Smith v. Marasco, 227 F. Supp. 2d 322, 354 n.33 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
af'd in part and rev'd in part, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The second Kneipp factor addresses
the standard of fault necessary in order to trigger liability. This element requires that the state actor
acted with willful disregard for, or deliberate indifference to, the plaintiff's safety. Lewis and Miller
require that the state actor's conduct shock the conscience."); Grazier v. City of Philadelphia, No.
Civ.A. 98-CV-6063, 2001 WL 1168093, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2001).
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example, in one case where settlement negotiations terminated based on
the plaintiffs reading of Third Circuit state-created danger precedent,
the Third Circuit went on to reject the plaintiffs claim in a nonprecedential6 opinion that characterized the claim as "border[ing] on
frivolity.'

13

The doctrinal ambiguity perpetuated by the Third Circuit's refusal to
issue precedential state-created danger decisions likely encouraged
litigation and discouraged settlement, thus undercutting the efficiency
rationale for non-precedential opinions. In 2004, a Third Circuit judge
candidly acknowledged that the doctrinal uncertainty following Lewis,
which the Third Circuit now recognizes as having substantially
narrowed state-created danger, likely encouraged plaintiffs to
characterize state tort claims as constitutional violations: "[T]he most
important of the recent modifications" to the circuit's state-created
danger precedent involved the Supreme Court's imposition of the shocks
the conscience standard:
[I]t is no longer enough that [the state actor] has acted in "willful
disregard" of the plaintiffs safety ....[T]he substitution of
"shocks the conscience" for willful disregard is a significant
limitation. In this context, our continued adherence to Kneipp
[Third Circuit precedent], if only in name, colors plaintiffs'
perception of their burden and tempts them to allege
constitutionalviolations where none exist. 137
During the Third Circuit's six-year precedential silence, the appellate
court repeatedly chastised plaintiffs for alleging state-created dangers on
facts that should have been alleged in tort. 138 In 2002, for example, a
non-precedential opinion not only refused to reach the issue of whether
136. Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Nos. 99-1980, 00-1647, at 5 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2001)
(unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author).
137. Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2004) (Ambro, J., concurring in the
judgment against emergency medical technicians) (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training
Inst., 2002 WL 1815859, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2002) ("This case presents another example of a
trend among plaintiffs who try to transmute their garden variety torts into cases of federal
constitutional dimension."), withdrawn and superseded by 318 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 2003); Webb, Nos.
99-1980, 00-1647, at 4 ("[M]ere negligence is not sufficient to state a claim under the state-created
danger theory."); id. at 5 ("[T]his record simply does not come close to establishing liability under
the state-created danger theory, and [the plaintiff's] assertions to the contrary border on frivolity.");
Solum v. Yerusalim, No. 99-1607, at 7 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential)
(on file with author) (finding that defendants "could not have acted with willful disregard for the
plaintiffs' liberty interests"); id. at 9 ("This suit is, when all is said and done, a tort action arising
from the condition of [the highway].").

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
Lewis raised the Third Circuit's lower fault standard to a shocks the
conscience standard, as the district court had held, but rebuked plaintiffs
for believing they had a constitutional claim at all: "We are faced in this
appeal with another case in which plaintiffs have tried to transmute their
state-law claims into constitutional torts."1 39 But given the divergence
between precedential and non-precedential opinions and the Third
Circuit's refusal to publish its many rejections of state-created danger
claims, plaintiffs' error may not have been careless lawyering but,
rather, evidence of a need for appellate guidance. However, the mental
culpability standard is only the first of the doctrinal divergences between
precedential and non-precedential opinions. The second is explored
below.
B.

Example Two: State-CreatedDanger Claims by Family Members

The reasoning of one Third Circuit non-precedential opinion would
preclude family members of most victims of state-created danger from
alleging derivative state-created danger claims, yet the circuit has never
issued a precedential opinion barring such actions. The practical
consequence of that innovation is starkly illustrated by the irreconcilable
analyses in two district court cases concerning similar claims by family
members that police failed to rescue a murder victim. One followed the
non-precedential opinion to reject the family's claims. The other did not
consider the non-precedential opinion and allowed certain of the
family's claims.
1.

Solum v. Yerusalim Likely Would PrecludeState-CreatedDanger
Claims by the Primary Victim's Family

Some state-created danger precedents have been litigated by relatives
of the injured person in their individual capacities (in addition to claims
by the injured person or the estate).1 40 The Third Circuit has not issued a
139. Jordan v. Houstoun, 39 F. App'x 795, 797 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming "essentially for the
reasons given by the District Court" in Kepner v. Houstoun, 164 F. Supp. 2d 494, 499-500 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (adopting the shocks the conscience standard)); see also id. ("We use a not-precedential

opinion in cases such as this, in which a precedential opinion is rendered unnecessary because the
opinion has no institutional or precedential value.").
140. In one, the husband and minor child of a murdered school teacher claimed that their rights of
association with the wife/mother were violated by school officials' failure to prevent the victim's
murder in a public school. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 904 (3d Cir. 1997). In
another, the parents and sibling of a murdered woman claimed that their rights of association with
the woman were violated by the police officers' failure to prevent her murder. Schieber v. City of
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precedential decision that separately addresses direct claims of the
injured person and the derivative claims of relatives. Yet one nonprecedential opinion likely would preclude derivative state-created
danger claims by family members of the victim.
In Solum v. Yerusalim, 141 the Third Circuit directly confronted a
derivative claim because the sole plaintiffs were the parents of a young
woman killed in a car accident and not the estate. The woman's parents
alleged that the defendant state transportation officials had known that
the portion of the highway where the fatal accident occurred was
unsafe. 142 The Third Circuit rejected the parents' claim on two broad
grounds, each of which would preclude most state-created danger claims
by relatives of the victim if Solum were precedential. 143 In Solum, the
Third Circuit clarified that, even if the state-created danger victim's
claim could succeed, the relatives' claims independently must satisfy the
four-prong state-created danger test. 144 Solum's reasoning would
foreclose most relatives from showing two of the four prongs: (1) that
harm to the family member by the state actor's conduct was foreseeable
and fairly direct and (2) that the government defendants acted with the
requisite mental culpability toward the
family members' liberty interests
45
in the companionship of the victim.1
Had it been precedential, Solum's reasoning would preclude most
derivative state-created danger claims by relatives because the harm to
family members of the primary victim would be too attenuated.
Specifically, in Solum the Third Circuit found the constitutional harm
alleged---deprivation of an assumed right to associate with the plaintiffs'
daughter-was not a foreseeable and fairly direct result of the state

Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 98-5648, 1999 WL 482310, at *1-5 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1999). In the
subsequent Third Circuit opinion in the litigation, Judge Stapleton "expressed 'no view' on whether
the Schiebers, as parents, had a liberty interest in the continued companionship of their adult,
emancipated child," noting the split in the circuits. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409,
423 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003). It is not always clear whether decisions concern individual state-created
danger claims by relatives of the injured party since such claims by relatives are derivative of the
injured person's state-created danger claim; therefore, the court has no need to discuss the relatives'
claims if the injured person's state-created danger claim fails, as occurred in Morse and Schieber.
141. No. 99-1607 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author).
142. See id. at 3-4.
143. The parents' claim also failed the third and fourth prongs of the state-created danger test, but
for reasons that would not necessarily preclude state-created danger claims by relatives of persons
injured by state action under different circumstances. See id. at 7-8.
144. See id. at 6-7.

145. See id.
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employees' actions because the harm was "just too attenuated."' 146 For
the same reason, that the constitutional harm alleged was too remote
from the state actors' conduct of not ensuring a safe stretch of highway,
the parents' state-created danger claim also failed to satisfy the mental
culpability standard.147 That the plaintiffs were family members of the
injured person was dispositive:
[The parents] brought this action on their own behalf alleging
the loss of their right of association with their daughter has
harmed them. However, that injury is just too attenuated to
support liability under § 1983.... The foreseeable injury here,
given the problems with this stretch of highway, is the death of
[the daughter], not the loss of48 any assumed constitutional right
to associate with one's child.'
The reasoning in Solum likely would preclude derivative state-created
danger claims by relatives of people injured by a state-created danger
whenever the state actors should not be expected to realize that their
conduct toward Person A would deprive Person A's family member,
Person B, of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in associating
with Person A. 149 For example, following Solum's reasoning, when
police respond to a 911 call alerting them to noises from a woman's
apartment, and do not break down the door, a foreseeable deprivation of
a liberty interest would be physical injury to the woman inside, not the
loss of any assumed constitutional right of the woman's parents or
children to associate with the woman. And if the police could not
realistically foresee that their response to the noises from the woman's
apartment could deprive the woman's parents or children of a
146. Id.

147. See id. at 7 (finding that since the defendants "could not realistically have foreseen the
constitutional injury" asserted, "as a matter of law, they could not have acted with [the requisite
mental culpability] for the plaintiffs' liberty interests").
148. Id. The Third Circuit assumed without deciding in Solum that parents of an emancipated
daughter had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in continued association with their adult
daughter, an issue that has split the federal circuits and was then an open issue in the Third Circuit.
That issue is no longer open. Since Solum, the Third Circuit has held that parents do not have a
protected liberty interest in the continued companionship of adult, emancipated children and for that
reason alone can no longer bring derivative state-created danger claims based on an injury to the
adult son or daughter. McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2003). The author filed an
amici brief in McCurdy on behalf of four New Jersey and Pennsylvania cities, urging the Third
Circuit to so rule. See Sarah E. Ricks, Evolution of a Doctrine: The Scope of the ParentalLiberty
Interest Protected by Substantive Due Process After McCurdy, 3 RUTGERS J. L. URB. POL'Y 138

(2005) (reprinting amici brief with introduction).
149. See Solum, No. 99-1607, at 6-7.
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constitutional right to associate with the woman, then police could not
have acted with the requisite
mental culpability toward the family
0
members' liberty interests.15
2.

UnpredictableApplication of the Non-PrecedentialDecision:
IrreconcilableDistrict Court Analyses of Claims by Family
Members of Two Murder Victims

The existence of an unpublished, non-precedential opinion that would
foreclose most derivative state-created danger claims by family members
created uncertainty about how the Third Circuit would require district
courts to treat such claims and therefore how attorneys should advise
their clients. A stark illustration of the practical consequences of the
doctrinal ambiguity are the irreconcilable analyses by the two district
courts in this Article's introductory vignette, each confronting claims by
family members of murder victims shortly after the Third Circuit issued
Solum. In both cases, neighbors of a woman called police because of
noises from the woman's apartment; in both cases, police responded but
refused to break down the door; in both cases, the women were later
found dead in their apartments; and in both cases, relatives of the dead
women alleged that their individual liberty interests in companionship
51
with the dead women had been deprived by the state-created danger.'
The similarity between the two cases was expressly noted by one judge
52
at oral argument.1
150. Some derivative family claims still would be permitted under Solum's reasoning. Certain
state defendants can reasonably foresee that their conduct could deprive a family member of the
person injured by a state-created danger of the family member's protected liberty interest in
association with the victim. That could be true whenever state action focused on the parent/child or
other family relationship, such as a government decision to alter a child custody situation.
151. See Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 156 F. Supp. 2d 451, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2001), rev'd on
other grounds, 320 F.3d 409 (3d Cir. 2003); White v. City of Philadelphia, 118 F. Supp. 2d 564,
566-67 (E.D. Pa. 2000). As a Senior Attorney for the City of Philadelphia Law Department, the
author edited the brief in support of the motion to dismiss in White and drafted part of the summary
judgment brief in Schieber.
152. At the summary judgment oral argument in Schieber, which took place after each district
court had decided motions to dismiss, and the other district court, in White, had dismissed the claim,
the Schieber trial judge raised the similarity:
THE COURT: [White] was a somewhat similar case, wasn't it?
MR. WINEBRAKE: It's very similar, Your Honor.... You know, when you have a-when
you have a District Court who holds a month and a half or two months ago that in an almost
identical case-I mean where literally plaintiffs appear to have pulled the Shannon Schieber
complaint out of the Clerk's Office and almost copied it word for word, setting forth the
sameTHE COURT: They tried to have it assigned to me as related.

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
In White v. City of Philadelphia,153 one district court rejected the
state-created danger claims of the murdered woman's mother and minor
child against the police officers who did not break down the door of the
woman later found murdered. 15 4 Specifically, that court held that the
relatives' claim must itself satisfy the state-created danger test, that the
officers could not have foreseen that their conduct would deprive the
victim's relatives of their right to associate with the dead woman, and
that the relatives' claims therefore failed to satisfy the "foreseeable and
fairly direct" injury element. 55 For the same reason, the relatives' claims
failed the mental culpability prong of the state-created danger test.' 56
In rejecting the relatives' claims, the district court followed the Third
Circuit's non-precedential opinion in Solum, noting that "this unreported
memorandum opinion has no precedential value, but [the district court]
finds it instructive."'' 57 The district court explicitly followed the nonprecedential reasoning to reject the family members' individual statecreated danger claims because, as the district court noted, "the Third
Circuit addressed the question whether parents could bring a due process
claim for loss of association with their child" and, "[a]s the [Third
Circuit] observed, even where injury to an individual is foreseeable, it
does not necessarily follow that injury suffered by the parents of the
injured party in the form of a loss of an 'assumed constitutional right to
associate' with that child is foreseeable."' 58 While the district court's
rejection of the family members' claims on a second prong of the statecreated danger test, the mental culpability prong, was not explicitly
based on the non-precedential opinion, it was a logical consequence of

MR. WINEBRAKE: Well, we know it went to another Judge, andTHE COURT: And he disagreed with me.
MR. WINEBRAKE: -and he disagreed, and I believe Judge DuBois' decision is correct and
Your Honor's decision was incorrect....
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, No. 98-5648 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
14, 2000).
153. 118 F. Supp. 2d 564 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
154. Id. at 566-67.
155. See id.
156. See id. ("[b]ecause the defendants could not have foreseen that [decedent's mother] and
[decedent's son] would suffer a constitutional injury," the officers' actions could not be conscience
shocking).
157. Id. at 573 n.8.
158. Id. at 573; see id. ("[Ilnterference with an 'assumed constitutional right to associate' suffered
by [the parent and child] was not a foreseeable consequence of defendants' actions.").
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the non-precedential reasoning as it turned on the absence of foreseeable
injury to the relatives of the murdered woman. 159
1 60 a different district
By contrast, in Schieber v. City of Philadelphia,
court considering claims against police by relatives of a murder victim
allowed the parents' state-created danger claims,' 6' without analyzing
them separately from the estate's claims. 162 Rather, the district court held
that the parents had a liberty interest in companionship of their adult
daughter, and then allowed the parents' claim. 163 Had Solum's analysis
been precedential and, thus, binding upon the district court, the existence
of a liberty interest would have been necessary but not sufficient: the
district court would have been required to separately analyze whether the
parents' claim met the state-created danger test and whether Solum's
reasoning precluded the attenuated claim of the parents, as is likely. But,
since Solum was non-precedential, the district court was free to disregard
it.
The different analyses of the two claims by the two district courts in
White and Scheiber demonstrate that doctrinal inconsistency between
precedential and non-precedential decisions can result in similar cases
being treated differently by district courts bound by the same circuit law.
One followed a non-precedential decision to reject the family members'
individual claims on grounds that likely would preclude most family
members from pursuing derivative state-created danger claims.' 64 The
other ignored the non-precedential opinion and allowed the family

159. Id.
160. 156 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Pa. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 320 F.3d 409 (3d Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at454, 461.
162. See id. at 457-61.
163. See id. at 456-57 (analyzing the existence of a parental liberty interest in the companionship
of their adult daughter). Even without Solum as guidance, the district court should not have assumed
that the existence of a constitutional right disposes of the different issue of whether that right has
been violated. On appeal, the Third Circuit declined to decide whether such a parental liberty
interest existed because the murdered woman's estate state-created danger claim failed the
culpability prong and the court therefore did not need to discuss the parents' derivative state-created
danger claims. See Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 423 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003). More
recently, the Third Circuit ruled that parents do not have a protected liberty interest in the continued
companionship of adult, emancipated children. See McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir.
2003). If decided today, in other words, the parents' claim would fail without reaching whether the
government conduct deprived the parents of a constitutional fight because no such constitutional
right exists: substantive due process does not protect the parental liberty interest asserted by the
parents in Schieber.
164. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text (summarizing the reasoning of White).
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65
members' individual claims to survive summary judgment. 1
Unpredictable application of non-precedential opinions undermines the
appellate functions of ensuring that like cases are treated alike, that
judicial decisions are not arbitrary, and that legal issues resolved at the
appellate level need not be relitigated before the district courts. This, in
turn, undermines litigants' ability to predict how district courts will rule,
which undermines the ability to evaluate claims for settlement. Explored
below is the third way in which non-precedential opinions are
inconsistent with Third Circuit precedent.

C.

Example Three: Necessity of Affirmative Government Action

The state action prong of the Third Circuit's state-created danger test
requires a plaintiff to show that "'the state actors used their authority to
create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed"' for the
harm to be inflicted on plaintiff.166 Third Circuit precedential decisions
disagree on whether the state action prong can only be satisfied by
affirmative conduct or whether state actors can be culpable for
omissions. While the Third Circuit has reconciled the inconsistent
precedent on the "use of authority" prong, it chose to do so in nonprecedential opinions. Confronting inconsistent precedent on the
necessity of affirmative government conduct to satisfy the state action
requirement has had practical consequences for district courts and
litigants attempting to predict Third Circuit dispositions of state-created
danger claims, as well as for settlement of those claims.
1.

State-CreatedDangerPrecedentRequires Affirmative State
Conduct

Until 1996, the Third Circuit plainly interpreted the state-created
danger theory to require affirmative state conduct. The Third Circuit
held en banc in D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical School 167 that, to fit the state-created danger exception to the
general no-duty rule of DeShaney, a plaintiff must show that the
government acted affirmatively to increase the risk of harm: "Liability
165. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text (summarizing the district court reasoning of
Schieber). The judgments in the two cases can be reconciled since survival of the estate's statecreated danger claim is necessary for the survival of the family's derivative claims, and the estate's
claim in White failed on prongs of the state-created danger test unaffected by Solum.
166. Schieber, 320 F.3d at 417 (quoting Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996)).
167. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the states'
affirmative acts which work to plaintiffs' detriments in terms of
exposure to danger." 168 The Third Circuit refused to adopt the statecreated danger theory on the facts of D.R.because the sexual assaults the
plaintiff school children suffered at school were not attributable to state
action. 169 Rather, the victims alleged a series of omissions by state
actors: failure to assign an experienced teacher, failure to supervise the
classroom, failure to investigate, and failure to report abuse to parents or
other authorities. 70 The "indefensible passivity" of some school
defendants "show[ed] nonfeasance but... d[id] not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.' 7' Rather, just as the Supreme Court had held
in DeShaney, where social workers did not prevent a father from beating
his son, "'[t]he most that can be said of the state functionaries in this
case is that they stood by and did nothing 72 when suspicious
circumstances dictated a more active role for them."
The facts on which the Third Circuit adopted the state-created danger
theory involved government conduct that, in a later opinion, it
characterized as barely affirmative. 173 In Kneipp, on a cold winter night,
a police officer stopped a husband and wife for causing a disturbance on
the street and noticed that both were intoxicated. 174 Other police officers
arrived, and the husband crossed the street to ask another officer if he
could go home to relieve the babysitter watching the couple's son, to
which the officer replied, "Yeah, sure."' 75 The husband then walked
home, about one-third of a block, assuming that because his wife was
drunk, the police would bring her either to a hospital or a police

168. Id. at 1374; see id. (finding that in cases upholding state-created danger claims, "the state
can fairly be said to have affirmatively acted to create the danger to the victims").
169. See id. at 1373-76.
170. See id. at 1373.
171. Id. at 1376.
172. Id. (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203
(1989)) (alteration in original). Similarly, while again declining to adopt the state-created danger
theory where an off-duty volunteer firefighter destroyed the plaintiff's business by arson, the Third
Circuit recognized that substantive due process liability could be imposed where the harm "is the
product of state action that legitimately can be characterized as affirmative conduct." Mark v.
Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1151 (3d Cir. 1995).
173. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 914 n.14 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Whether the
officers's [sic] actions in Kneipp constituted an affirmative act or an act of omission is a close
question.").
174. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201, 1203 n.14 (3d Cir, 1996).
175. Id. at 1201-02.
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station. 11 6 Police did not accompany the wife home, and when she was
found unconscious outside later that night, exposure to the cold had
permanently rendered her unable to normally walk, see, sit, swallow, or
speak. 177
In Kneipp, the Third Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that
telling the husband "'you can leave,' ... reasonably implied that [police]
would take care of his wife," and that "[t]his affirmative action on the
part of the police led [the husband] to leave his wife unattended,
something he alleges he otherwise would not have done." 17 8 The Third
Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find this satisfied the state
action prong because "the danger was created when [the wife] was
her private source of rescue and subsequently abandoned
separated from
179
by police.
2.

Subsequent State-CreatedDanger PrecedentDoes Not Require
Affirmative State Conduct

The following year, 1997, in Morse v. Lower Merion School
District,8 ° the Third Circuit retreated from its holding that state-created
danger required affirmative action to satisfy the state action prong, and
shifted the focus to the foreseeability of the harm.' 8' The court first
characterized the state action in the drunken woman case as scarcely
affirmative-"[w]hether the officer's actions in [the drunken woman
case] constituted an affirmative act or an act of omission is a close
question"182-but then decided that "[w]hether an affirmative act rather
than an act of omission is required under the state-created danger
theory" was not the proper focus of the state action inquiry."' Rather,
the court held in Morse that "the dispositive factor appears to be whether
the state has in some way placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position
more appropriately
that was foreseeable, and not whether the act'was
84
,1
omission.
or
act
affirmative
an
as
characterized

176. Id.
177. Id. at 1202 n.9, 1203 & n.16.
178. Id. at 1202 n.7.
179. Id. at 1202 n.9.
180. 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997).
181. See id.at 915.

182. Id. at 914 n.14.
183. Id.
at 915.
184. Id.; see also id. at 904, 915-16 (ruling that where a public school unlocked a door to permit
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The Third Circuit's precedential decision in Morse appeared to
remove the requirement of affirmative government conduct, to collapse
the state action prong into the foreseeability of the harm, and to suggest
that, where the harm suffered by plaintiff was foreseeable, an omission
by the state would satisfy the plaintiffs burden. These are considerable
expansions of the state-created danger doctrine since government
actors-such as social workers, police officers, school officials,
firefighters, and security guards-frequently undertake to protect
discrete classes of citizens from foreseeable dangers.
3.

Non-PrecedentialReconciliation of the Apparent Conflict

The Third Circuit subsequently reconciled its apparently inconsistent
precedents on the need for affirmative state conduct-but chose to do so
in a non-precedential decision. In Estate of Henderson v. City of
Philadelphia,'85 police responded to a mother's request to involuntarily
commit her mentally ill son and, within minutes of the officers' arrival,
while police stood on the first floor of the house reading the commitment
papers, the son walked upstairs and 86jumped out a window, resulting in
severe and permanent head injuries.'
In a non-precedential decision in Henderson, the same Third Circuit
judge who authored the precedent that eliminated the requirement of
affirmative government conduct reconciled the apparently conflicting
precedential requirements by clarifying that a government's failure to
rescue a plaintiff from harm can only be culpable conduct when an
affirmative duty to rescue arises from government intervention that
increased the risk of harm.18 7 The non-precedential opinion apparently
read as dicta the precedential decision's suggestion
that inaction could
88
be culpable in the face of foreseeable harm.'
workmen temporary access to the interior, through which a murderer entered and killed a teacher,
the state defendants had not placed the victim in harm's way because the murderer's attack was "not
a foreseeable and fairly direct result of defendants' behavior"). The Third Circuit read its earlier en
banc decision in D.R. to have turned not on the absence of affirmative government conduct to
expose the school children to sexual assaults but on the absence of a direct causal connection
between the "acts or omissions of the state" and the harm suffered by plaintiffs; it was not "the act
or omission of the state actor that directly placed the victim in harm's way." Id. at 915.
185. No. 99-1579 (3d Cir. May 2, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author).
186.
187.
188.
The
that

Id. at 3-7.
See id. at 14.
The court held:
defendant officers did not 'use their authority [as police officers] to create an opportunity
otherwise would not have existed' for Henderson to harm himself. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at

Non-Precedential Opinions: A Case Study
The clarification that government inaction can only be culpable state
action when it follows an affirmative use of government authority to
create the harm was a significant retreat from the broad language in
Third Circuit precedent. 189 But the reconciliation was not precedential.
Had the Third Circuit's significant narrowing of its 1997 precedent been
precedential, district courts and litigants could have relied on it to
reconcile the inconsistent
dictates on the state action prong of the state90
created danger test.'
4.

PracticalConsequences of DoctrinalInconsistencyfor District
Courts and Litigants

The doctrinal inconsistency between the Third Circuit's varying
statements on the necessity of affirmative government conduct to satisfy
1208. In fact, the heart of the plaintiff's allegation asserts the opposite-the police failed to
exercise their authority as police officers to place Salim Henderson in custody as soon as they
arrived at the Henderson home.
Although we have suggested that inaction by government actors can be the basis for
liability under Section 1983, see Morse, 132 F.3d at 915, in the cases in which we have found
liability, inaction has been preceded by a deliberate exercise of authority. In Kneipp, for
example, we found the defendant officers potentially liable for leaving Mrs. Kneipp to find her
own way home, but predicated that on their having acted to separate her from any private
source of assistance. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1210 ("The affirmative acts of the police officers
here created a dangerous situation, requiring that they take additional measures to ensure
[Kneipp's] safety."). Here, there is no allegation the defendant officers separated Salim
Henderson from his private source of assistance nor did anything more than respond to Mrs.
Henderson's call.
Id.
189. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (summarizing the reasoning of Morse).
190. As this Article was going to press, a Third Circuit majority--over vehement dissentattempted to reconcile earlier Third Circuit precedent with the suggestion in Morse that an omission
could be sufficient for culpability. See Bright v. Westmoreland County, No. 05-2005, __ F.3d __
(Apr. 4, 2006), slip op. at 16 n.7. Writing for the majority, Judge Stapleton quoted the Morse
"observ[ation]" that foreseeability of harm rather than affirmative action was dispositive of the
fourth prong but judged it "important to put this observation in context." Id. The majority concluded
that the omission language was essentially dicta:
[W]e do not read Morse's language to suggest liability can be based on an omission alone or a
failure to act. We read it to clarify that the relevant test involves asking whether a state actor's
behavior constituted an affirmative act, and, if so, whether the affirmative act created a
foreseeable opportunity for harm.
Id. The dissent focused entirely on the majority's reading of the fourth element of the state-created
danger test to require affirmative state action and addressed the tension between this holding and
Morse:
Our recent cases have shifted away from inquiring into the existence of affirmative acts as a
standard to establish the fourth element of our test .... [A]s Morse represents a controlling
case, I cannot join in the majority's assertion to the contrary, that the hallmark of our test is
whether the acts can be characterized as affirmative.
Id. at 31-32 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
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state action undermined the predictive value of precedent and had
practical consequences for district courts and litigants evaluating
settlement of state-created danger claims. Some government litigants
relied on the Third Circuit's non-precedential reconciliation of its
conflicting positions, its recognition that a failure to rescue is only
culpable state action where the state had first acted affirmatively to
increase the risk of danger to plaintiff.1 9'
Other district courts and litigants relied on the Third Circuit's
precedential ruling that an omission could be sufficient for state action.
For example, in ruling that a rational jury could find police liable for not
breaking down a crime victim's door and for telling neighbors to do
nothing but call 911 if they heard additional noises from the victim's
apartment, a district court held that "inadequate intervention" could have
increased the risk of harm, and quoted the Third Circuit's ruling that
state placement of the victim in a foresecably dangerous position was
dispositive, "'not whether the act was more appropriately characterized
as an affirmative act or omission.' 192 In a suit against courthouse
security, another plaintiff similarly read the Third Circuit's precedent to
have collapsed state action into foreseeability of the harm.193 There,
Family Court administrators knew that litigants had been attacked in the
courthouse and, to reduce that risk, instructed guards to limit access to

191. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at *23, Schieberv. City of Philadelphia No. 01-2312, 2001 WL
34117938 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2001) ("Although dicta in Morse suggested that inaction alone might
satisfy the state created danger theory, Morse's author, the Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, subsequently
clarified that this Court, including the Kneipp panel, has never found inaction to be sufficient in the
absence of a 'deliberate exercise of authority'...." (quoting Henderson, No. 99-1579, at 14));
Brief of Appellees at *19, Cannon v. Beal, No. 00-1208, 2000 WL 33993771 (3d Cir. Dec. 18,
2000) ("As the Henderson panel explains, in [the drunken woman case, the police officer] was
liable under the state created danger theory not because he abandoned Samantha on her cold walk
home; he was liable only because that omission was preceded by a 'deliberate exercise of his
authority' to separate Samantha from her private source of rescue, her husband. No. 99-1579, slip
op. at 14, sa 112. Thus in Henderson, a panel of this court determined that police officers were not
liable for failing to act on Mrs. Henderson's statement that her son might jump from an upstairs
window because they had merely failed to act rather than putting Mrs. Henderson's son in that
dangerous situation themselves or using their authority to prevent Mrs. Henderson from rescuing
him herself.").
192. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 156 F. Supp. 2d 451, 460 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting Morse,
132 F.3d at 915). The Third Circuit ultimately ruled the police conduct no more than negligent. See
Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 423 (3d Cir. 2003).
193. Brief and Appendix Volume I for Appellant at *3-10, *33, Webb v. City of Philadelphia,
Nos. 99-1980, 00-1647, 1999 WL 33620403 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2001). The Third Circuit later ruled
that conduct no more than negligent. Webb, Nos. 99-1980, 00-1647, at 4.
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litigants themselves. 194 The plaintiff, a subpoenaed litigant attacked by a
person who should have been barred by security, argued that state action
was satisfied by the guard's omission, which placed the victim in a
foreseeably dangerous position.' 95
The Third Circuit's apparent approval of omissions by government
actors as satisfying use of state authority likely encouraged litigation and
impeded settlement by causing litigants and district courts to overvalue
claims based on negligent conduct. Since non-precedential opinions
issued by the Third Circuit before 2002 are not available in electronic
form, 196 litigants and district courts would know the 1997 precedent that
apparently expanded state-created danger to include inaction but would
be unlikely to know of the 2000 non-precedential retreat from that
holding. Those relying on the published law may have perceived
constitutional claims when the facts were more likely to be viewed by
the Third Circuit as state law torts, thus encouraging litigation, impeding
settlement,' 97 and undermining the efficiency rationale for nonprecedential opinions.
D.

Example Four: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability

A final doctrinal divergence between precedential and nonprecedential opinions concerns municipal liability for state-created
danger. In 1994, Third Circuit precedent held that municipalities could
be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional wrongdoing even in
the absence of liability by an individual state actor. 198 This precedent
was widely criticized.199 Perhaps in response to such criticism, in two
non-precedential opinions in 2000, the Third Circuit purported to modify
its precedential theory.20 Even after the 2003 issuance of a precedential
opinion on municipal liability for state-created danger in the absence of

194. Brief and Appendix Volume I for Appellant at *3-10, *15-16, *23, Webb, Nos. 99-1980,
00-1647.
195. See id. at *3-6, *16-17, *32-33.
196. See 3D CIR. IOP 5.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf
(providing, in Internal Operating Rules effective July 1, 2002, that non-precedential opinions are to
be posted on the court's website); supra note 7 and accompanying text.
197. See Hoffman, supra note 75, at 2 ("[]f... a plaintiff values a case too high or the defendant
too low, settlement becomes difficult or impossible.").
198. See infra Part IV.D.I.
199. See infra Part IV.D.1.
200. See infra Part IV.D.2.
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individual liability,2 °' the contours of the theory remain too unclear for
non-precedential application, which should be limited to applications of
settled doctrine.
1.

Third CircuitPrecedentRequired Examination of Municipal
LiabilityEven in the Absence of ConstitutionalWrongdoing by
IndividualActors

The Supreme Court held in Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Texas 20 2 that a municipal liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should
be analyzed in two steps: "(1) whether plaintiffs harm was caused by a
constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for
that violation. ' ' 2 03 Over a decade ago, the Third Circuit apparently read
the Supreme Court's statutory standard for holding a government liable
for the constitutional wrongdoing of its employee to instead create a
direct constitutional theory of municipal liability. In Fagan v. City of
Vineland, °4 a high speed police chase case, the Third Circuit held that
municipal liability under § 1983 for a substantive due process violation
does not depend on the individual employee's liability and that a
constitutional violation can exist even if no individual police officer
violated the Constitution.20 5
A year after Fagan, in a precedential state-created danger decision,
the Third Circuit acknowledged "some inconsistency in our circuit as to

201. See infra Part IV.D.4.
202. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
203. Id. at 120.
204. 22 F.3d 1283, 1291-94 (3d Cir. 1994) (summarizing district court reasoning).
205. Id. at 1292, 1293 n.4. The Third Circuit reversed the district court, which had relied on the
Supreme Court's straightforward holding in City of Los Angeles v. Heller:
[None of] our cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on
the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no
constitutional harm. If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the
individual police officer, the fact that the department regulations might have authorizedthe use
of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.
Id. at 1291 (summarizing district court reasoning and quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). The Third Circuit ruled Heller "should not be read so broadly as to
automatically preclude municipal liability absent an individual police officer's liability." Fagan, 22
F.3d at 1291. Fagan distinguished Heller as (1) not concerning an independent § 1983 claim against
the municipality but instead based on respondeat superior; and (2) limited to Fourth Amendment
claims. Id. at 1291-93. While the officers in hot pursuit could only be liable if their conduct
shocked the conscience, Fagan held that the city could be liable "if its policymakers, acting with
deliberate indifference, implemented a policy of inadequate training and thereby caused the officers
to conduct the pursuit in an unsafe manner ..... Id. at 1292. The Fagan panel did not cite Collins.
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the standard governing the underlying constitutional violation in policy,
custom or practice cases" ' 20 6 because the Fagan panel may have misread
the statutory standard for holding a municipality liable for an employee's
constitutional wrongdoing to instead describe a separate constitutional
standard.2 °7 The court suggested that the Fagan panel had skipped the
first prong of the municipal liability analysis required by the Supreme
Court in Collins:
[T]he Faganpanel opinion appeared to hold that a plaintiff can
establish a constitutional violation predicate to a claim of
municipal liability simply by demonstrating that the
policymakers, acting with deliberate indifference, enacted an
inadequate policy that caused an injury. It appears that, by
focusing almost exclusively on the 'deliberate indifference'
prong of the Collins test, the panel opinion did not apply the first
prong-establishing an underlying constitutional violation.20 8
Federal and state courts have widely rejected the Fagan panel
decision and both courts and commentators have criticized it as
inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine. 20 9 The validity of that
206. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 n.13 (3d Cir. 1995).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. The First Circuit declined to follow Fagan because it "improperly applied the Supreme
Court's teachings" by "ignor[ing]" the initial requirement that the plaintiff's harm be caused by a
constitutional violation and instead treated the statutory requirement of deliberate indifference as a
separate constitutional theory of municipal liability. Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1039-40 (1st
Cir. 1996); see Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1150, 1155 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001); Thompson v.
Boggs, 33 F.3d 847, 859 n.l 1 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting Fagan'sdistinction of Heller and following
"the clear holding of Heller"); Hildebrandt v. City of Fairbanks, 957 P.2d 974, 977 (Alaska 1998)
(rejecting Fagan because "[tihe Third Circuit's approach appears to conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1983 as set forth in City of Canton and Collins").
Similarly, despite usually following Third Circuit interpretations of federal law, a state court within
the Third Circuit rejected Fagan'sindependent theory of municipal liability because "[i]t has not
stood the test of time even in the Third Circuit" and the response of other circuits "has been even
less sanguine." Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 804 A.2d 97, 111 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
Professor Karen Blum argued that the Third Circuit in Fagan omitted the constitutional inquiry
required by Collins by confusing the statutory issue of whether a city could be held accountable for
its employee's constitutional wrongdoing for an independent constitutional theory of municipal
liability:
Fagan rests on the premise that a plaintiff who can show injury and ... deliberate indifference
on the part of the city may hold the city liable under § 1983 for that injury.... With no
constitutional violation committed by the non-policymaking employee(s) and with a showing
of only ... deliberate indifference, there is simply no constitutional violation made out and
there is no basis for § 1983 liability on anyone's part. The Third Circuit's mistake in Fagan is
in treating proof of statutory responsibility under Canton's deliberate indifference standard as
proof of constitutional liability under Collins.
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criticism is beyond the scope of this Article. What is significant here is
that Third Circuit precedent has adhered to Fagan.210 In its precedent
adopting the state-created danger doctrine, the Third Circuit chastised
the district court for failing to evaluate the claim against the city because
"[t]he precedent in our circuit requires the district court to review the
plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently of the § 1983 claims
against the individual police officers. 21 Yet the Third Circuit continued
to send conflicting signals to litigants and district courts by
acknowledging Supreme Court authority for the proposition that a
municipal liability claim will fail in the absence of an underlying
constitutional violation. 1 2
2.

Non-PrecedentialMunicipal Liability Opinions Permitted
Rejection of Claims Against Individuals to Be Dispositive of the
MunicipalLiability Claim

Following criticism of Fagan, the Third Circuit issued two nonprecedential opinions in 2000 that permitted rejection of claims against
individuals to be dispositive of municipal liability claims by
distinguishing Fagan on analytically unsound grounds. In both nonprecedential opinions, the Third Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to
show substantive due process violations by the individual police officers
and that this conclusion was dispositive of the § 1983 claims against the

Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability: Derivative or Direct? Statutory or Constitutional?
Distinguishingthe Canton Casefrom the Collins Case, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 687, 704-05 (1999); see
Roger W. Kirst, Constitutional Rights of Bystanders in the War on Crime, 28 N.M. L. REv. 59, 65
(1998) (noting that that "result appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's position in cases such
as Collins and DeShaney"); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850, n.10
(1998) (citing Canton for the proposition that deliberate indifference is the standard of culpability
"to sustain a claim of municipal liability for failure to train an employee who causes harm by
unconstitutional conduct for which he would be individually liable"); DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 n.10 (1989) (holding consistently with Heller that,
because substantive due process did not require the government to protect a child against private
violence inflicted by the boy's father, the Court did not need to consider plaintiff's § 1983 claim
against the county).
210. In its precedent criticizing Fagan, the Third Circuit first concluded that failure to show a
constitutional violation was conclusive of the municipal liability claim, then proceeded to "assume"
a state-created danger violation in order to analyze the municipal liability claim, in deference to the
binding Fagan analysis that absence of constitutional wrongdoing by individuals is not dispositive
of the claim against the city. See Mark, 51 F.3d at 1153-54.
211. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996).
212. Id. at 1212 n.26; see In re City of Phila. Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 972 (3d Cir. 1995) (one judge
questioning Fagan'smunicipal liability analysis).
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municipalities. 213 The Third Circuit's non-precedential distinction of
Fagan was accomplished with semantic sleight of hand: the panels
inquired only into constitutional wrongdoing by the individual
defendants and, without inquiring into direct constitutional wrongdoing
by the municipality as Fagan requires, concluded there had been no
constitutional wrongdoing, and therefore no municipal liability. 2 14 The

non-precedential decisions reasoned identically, using nearly identical
language, suggesting one followed the other:
Whether there is an underlying constitutional violation also will
help clarify municipal liability for if there is no violation, there
can be no municipal liability. Cf City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) ("If a person has suffered
no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police
officers, the fact that the departmental regulations might have
authorized the use215of constitutionally excessive force is quite
beside the point.").

The absence of a constitutional violation also resolves the
question of municipal liability. Although it is undoubtedly true
that a municipality's "liability under section 1983 for a
substantive due process violation does not depend upon an
individual officer's liability," Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1293, it is
equally true that a Section 1983 claim requires a constitutional
violation. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 799. As there
is no
2 16
constitutionalviolation, there is no municipal liability.

213. Estate of Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-1579, at 7-9, 15 (3d Cir. May 2, 2000)
(unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author); Estate of Burke v. Mahanoy City, No. 991357, at 6, 12 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author). In
Burke, the estate of a partygoer shot and killed by a drunken party guest alleged that the defendant
police officers had violated his substantive due process rights by failing to protect him from the
dangerous situation the officers helped to create by their response to a fight at the party, and that the
municipality was liable for its custom of turning a blind eye to public drunkenness. Burke, No. 991357, at 3-5. In Henderson, the estate of a mentally ill young man alleged that the defendant police
officers had violated his substantive due process rights by failing to protect him from the dangerous
situation the officers helped to create while attempting to involuntarily commit him, resulting in
severe and permanent head injuries, and that the municipality was liable for inadequately training
and supervising the officers. Henderson, No. 99-1579, at 3-8.
214. See Henderson, No. 99-1579, at 8-9; Burke, No. 99-1357, at 6.
215. Burke, No. 99-1357, at 6 (first emphasis added) (citation omitted); Henderson, No. 99-1579,
at 8-9 (identical wording).
216. Burke, No. 99-1357, at 12 (emphasis added); see Henderson, No. 99-1579, at 15 (using nearidentical wording).
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Whether consistent with Supreme Court teaching, the nonprecedential distinction of Fagan is not consistent with how the Third
Circuit had instructed district courts to apply Fagan'stheory of direct
municipal liability for substantive due process claims. 2 7 Neither opinion
explained the failure to undertake Fagan's theory of direct municipal
liability once the individual defendants had been absolved of inflicting
"a constitutional injury. '21 8 The appellate court function of ensuring
doctrinal uniformity was undermined by the Third Circuit's broad
reading of the Supreme Court's Heller decision in two non-precedential
decisions because the Third Circuit's precedential decisions required
district courts and litigants to analyze219
its direct theory of constitutional
wrongdoing by the municipality itself.

The two non-precedential opinions were not, however, the circuit's
only state-created danger municipal liability decisions. The court issued
non-precedential opinions on at least seven other state-created danger
claims concerning municipal liability between its precedential decisions
in 1997 and 2003. Two did not differentiate claims against individuals
from those against the municipality.220 But five appear consistent with
217. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1213.
218. Henderson, No. 99-1579, at 9 n.5 ("This is not to say that there must be actionable conduct
by the defendant officers for the City or former Commissioner Neal to be held liable. See Fagan v.
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994) ('A finding of municipal liability does not
depend automatically or necessarily on the liability of any police officer.'). There must, however, be
a constitutional injury for the municipality to be held liable under [42] U.S.C. § 1983.").
219. The Fagan independent theory of constitutional wrongdoing by a municipality is predicated
on differing fault standards for substantive due process violations by the individual and by the
municipality. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994). The two Third Circuit
non-precedential decisions that distinguished Faganwithout engaging its direct theory of municipal
liability (Burke and Henderson) both discussed whether the mental culpability standard for
individual liability under the state-created danger theory should be "shocks the conscience" but did
not resolve the issue because the facts in those cases did not meet the lower threshold of willful
disregard, which is interchangeable with the deliberate indifference fault standard applicable to
"direct" constitutional wrongdoing by the municipality, according to Fagan. But because proof of
fault would differ for the individual and municipal defendants, a faithful reading of Fagan would
seem to have required separate analysis of the city liability claim, a choice the Third Circuit
declined in favor of its shortcut distinction of Fagan. In the non-precedential opinion which did
adopt the "shocks the conscience" standard for individual employee substantive due process
violations, the Third Circuit did separately analyze the municipal liability claim under the deliberate
indifference standard, which is consistent with Fagan.See Cannon v. Beal, No. 00-1208, at 6-7 (3d
Cir. Apr. 23, 2001) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author).
220. See Marcolongo v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 99-2015 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2001) (unpublished
and non-precedential) (on file with author) (agreeing with "thorough analysis" of district court);
Solum v. Yerusalim, No. 99-1607 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on
file with author) (providing no separate discussion of municipal liability but affirming judgment for
municipality).

266
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Fagan as each analyzed constitutional wrongdoing by the municipality
despite the absence of constitutional wrongdoing by an individual.22'
3.

PracticalConsequences of DoctrinalInconsistencyfor District
Courts and Litigants

The lack of doctrinal uniformity left litigants and district courts
confused about how to apply the Third Circuit's criticized theory that
municipal liability in substantive due process cases can be independent
of claims against individual state actors, rather than derivative of claims
against individuals. Some government litigants relied on the nonprecedential distinction of Fagan.222 Meanwhile, district courts were
struggling to reconcile the independent theory of municipal liability
articulated in Faganboth with Supreme Court decisions that preexisted
Fagan (Heller, Collins, and City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris223 ) and with
Supreme Court decisions that postdated Fagan (Lewis).224
Doctrinal inconsistency may have caused federal courts to expend
more resources in resolving state-created danger litigation and
discouraged settlement of municipal liability claims, thus undercutting
the efficiency rationale for issuing non-precedential opinions. For

221. See Hansell v. City of Atlantic City, 46 F. App'x. 665 (3d Cir. 2002); Pahler v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 31 F. App'x 69 (3d Cir. 2002); Combs v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 32 F. App'x 653 (3d
Cir. 2002) (appeal after five-day trial of state-created danger claim against a school district where
no individual violated plaintiff's constitutional rights); Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Nos. 99-1980,
00-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2001) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author) (failing to
cite Fagan but reaching municipal liability in absence of individual constitutional wrongdoing);
Cannon, No. 00-1208; cf Henderson, No. 99-1579; Burke, No. 99-1357 (essentially following
Heller).
222. Brief for Appellees at *50, Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 2001 WL 34112171 (3d Cir. Mar.
19, 2001); Brief for Appellees at *41-42, Cannon v. Beal, 2000 WL 33993771 (3d Cir. Dec. 18,
2000).
223. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
224. See, e.g., White v. City of Philadelphia, 118 F. Supp. 2d 564, 575-76 (E.D. Pa. 2000);
Brown v. Commonwealth, No. 99-4901, 2000 WL 562743, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2000)
(disapproving municipal litigant's reliance on Heller and indicating that precluding municipal
liability for lack of individual liability "is not the law in the Third Circuit"), affd 300 F.3d 310 (3d
Cir. 2002); Cannon v. Beal, 86 F. Supp. 2d 460, 473 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[R]eading Canton, Collins,
and Fagan I together, the applicable standard of fault in a municipal liability case, in which the
individual state actors did not commit a constitutional tort, remains unclear."); Estate of Henderson
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 98-3861, 1999 WL 482305, at *21 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 1999); Estate of
Burke v. Mahanoy City, 40 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also Leddy v. Twp. of Lower
Merion, 114 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (outside of state-created danger context, noting
"there is some inconsistency in our circuit as to the standard governing the underlying constitutional
violation" in municipal liability cases).
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example, one district court required a trial of state-created danger claims
against the municipality even after granting judgment to all individual
defendants.2 25 Other district courts instead ignored the Third Circuit's
independent theory of municipal liability and treated substantive due
process claims against cities as derivative of claims against individual
defendants.22 6 At least one district court suggested that the Third Circuit
revisit its theory of municipal liability independent of individual
substantive due process violations
while acknowledging it was
227
meanwhile bound by Fagan.
Because they are unavailable on Westlaw or Lexis and are not
228 many district courts likely were unaware
published in a print reporter, 22
of the non-precedential opinions issued before 2002. However, one
district court flatly rejected a municipal litigant's attempted reliance on
one of the non-precedential decisions discussed above, which the litigant
had cited in distinguishing Fagan.229 Further, the district court criticized
another district court for having followed the non-precedential opinions:
THE COURT:... Do you rely on [a non-precedential Third
Circuit opinion]?
MR. WINEBRAKE: We rely on [the] District Court decision in
[that case], and we apprised the Court of the unpublished
225. Compare Combs v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 99-3812, 2000 WL 1611061, at *7 (Oct. 26,
2000) (granting summary judgment to all individual government defendants but denying judgment
to government), with Combs v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 32 F. App'x 653, 655 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that
the trial against the government took five days).
226. See Bright v. Westmoreland County, No. 03-1072, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25825 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 30, 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 380 F.3d 729, 736 (3d Cir. 2004); Rowland v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 97-2143, 1997 WL 677165, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1997) (without citing Fagan,
applying Heller: "Where there is no constitutional violation by a municipal employee, there can be
no liability on the part of the municipality."); see also Doman v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-6543,
2000 WL 1224906, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (outside of state-created danger context, dismissing
municipal liability claim upon finding no individual city employee violated plaintiff's constitutional
rights and citing Fagan as "but cf"), appeal dismissed sub nom. Doman v. Pa. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 33 F. App'x 647 (3d Cir. 2002).
227. Gillyard v. Stylios, No. 97-6555, 1998 WL 966010, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec 23, 1998); see also
Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, No. 01-2572, 2002 WL 32350019, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2002)
(outside state-created danger, summarizing criticism of Fagan but conceding it is binding "[u]ntil
the Court of Appeals decides to the contrary"); Cannon, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 475-76 ("The confusion
regarding how to evaluate a municipality's liability is buttressed by the . . . Third Circuit's
recognition in Mark of Fagan l's failure to evaluate the applicable standard for the underlying
constitutional violation.").
228. See supra notes 7, 88.
229. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-24, Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, No. 98-5648 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 14, 2000).
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opinion because we think it's good to know that the Third
Circuit in a seemingly well thought out opinion written by Judge
Scirica upheld [the district court].
THE COURT: Well, that's very interesting. It was not for
publication and has no precedential value. At a conference of the
Third Circuit, the Court of Appeals defended their unpublished
opinions on the ground that they're not well reasoned, they don't
give them much thought. So it's hard to say that that's a wellreasoned opinion that has any precedential value.
MR. WINEBRAKE: Well, we concedeTHE COURT: It's instructive on what they'll do without much
thought.
MR. WINEBRAKE: True. But it's instructive, Your Honor, and
it's also-it's also interesting to see how they handled some of
the issues-how they handled the Fagan issue, for example.
THE COURT: I don't intend to rely on the affirmance by the
Court of Appeals in [the non-precedential opinion]. I think it
was incorrect of [another district court judge] to cite [Third
Circuit non-precedential state-created danger opinions] as he
did. What I meanMR. W1NEBRAKE: Your HonorTHE COURT:-[The other district court] may be correct in his
ultimate decision [citing non-precedential opinions], but I think
that the Court of Appeals has instructed us not to rely on
unpublished opinions, and we're obliged to comply with that
instruction.23 °
Had the non-precedential distinction of Fagan instead been precedential,
and therefore binding on the district court, the district court would not
have been free to ignore the Third Circuit's retreat from its criticized
municipal liability theory.23 1
230. Id.
231. Compounding the doctrinal confusion about the Third Circuit's theory of direct municipal
liability for substantive due process claims is its suggestion in Mark that the state-created danger
theory is inapplicable where the state actor alleged to have created the danger is the municipality
itself. The Third Circuit ruled in Mark that a claim against a municipality under the state-created
danger theory runs afoul of the requirement that there be some relationship between the plaintiff and
the state actor, because policies are not promulgated to apply to specific persons:
When the alleged unlawful act is a policy directed at the public at large-namely a failure to
protect the public by failing adequately to screen applicants for membership in a volunteer fire
company-the rationale behind the rule disappears-there can be no specific knowledge by the
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The Doctrineof Independent Municipal Liabilityfor State-Created
DangerIs Insufficiently Settledfor Non-PrecedentialApplication

Recent Third Circuit state-created danger precedent suggests that,
even now, the contours of Fagan's theory of independent substantive
due process violations by a municipality remain insufficiently settled for
routine, non-precedential application. A precedential opinion issued by
the Third Circuit in 2003 acknowledged the widespread criticism of
Fagan.232 That 2003 precedent could be read broadly to link the
existence of constitutional harm to the conduct of the individuals,
eviscerating the Third Circuit's theory of independent municipal liability
for state-created danger claims,233 and thereby making precedential the
distinction of Fagan first articulated in non-precedential opinions years
earlier. 3 But the 2003 precedent simultaneously adhered to Fagan,
holding that "[i]t is possible for a municipality to be held independently
defendant of the particular plaintiffs condition, and there is no relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff.
Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir. 1995).
232. Brown v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318
F.3d 473, 482 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Mark, 51 F.3d at 1153 n.13; Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239
F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2001); Young v. City of Mount Ranier [sic], 238 F.3d 567, 579 n.9
(4th Cir. 2001); Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir. 1996); Thompson v. Boggs, 33 F.3d
847, 859 n. I (7th Cir. 1994)). Further, another 2003 precedent appears to limit Fagan's theory of
direct constitutional wrongdoing by a municipality to its facts-a police chase. See Grazier ex rel.
White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003).
233. See Brown, 318 F.3d at 481-83. In Brown, the Third Circuit cited Fagan but did not define
the constitutional right by parsing the differing intent of the individuals and of the municipality but
rather applied a single definition of the plaintiff's constitutional right against both the individual and
the municipal defendant. Id. at 482-83. Reading Brown broadly in a non-precedential opinion, the
Third Circuit held the absence of individual liability to be conclusive of municipal liability because
if the individual actors did not create a danger to the plaintiff, the harm caused was not
constitutional harm. Liedy v. Borough of Glenolden, 117 F. App'x 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2004). In
Liedy, the Third Circuit rejected the state-created danger claims of the estate of a murder victim and
of her daughter, a rape victim, against the police who released the sex offender from custody,
disposing of municipal liability in a single sentence: "[B]ecause we conclude that there was no
constitutional tort in this case, there is also no municipal liability." Id.; see Green v. City of
Philadelphia, 92 F. App'x 873, 876 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Fagan but affirming judgment for
municipality without analyzing differing states of mind of the city and of individuals because
"Heller controlled" where "officers' liability is the predicate for the City's liability" and officers'
return of confiscated gun to shooter did not violate constitution by creating danger to victim);
Crawford v. Beard, No. 04-0777, 2005 WL 139082, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2005) (following
Brown in rejecting municipal liability for state-created danger claim "[b]ecause there was no
constitutional tort").
234. See Estate of Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-1579 (3d Cir. May 2, 2000)
(unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author); Estate of Burke v. Mahanoy City, No. 991357 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential) (on file with author).
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liable for a substantive due process violation even in situations where
none of its employees are liable.,, 235 Direct municipal liability for statecreated danger, therefore, remains insufficiently clear for nonprecedential application, which should be restricted to application of
settled law.
V.

LAWMAKING IN THE DIVERSE FACTUAL CONTEXTS OF
STATE-CREATED DANGER

Making new law is likely in state-created danger appellate decisions
because the doctrine draws meaning from its application in widely
varying factual contexts. The state-created danger claims discussed in
this Article arose in diverse scenarios-e.g., a courthouse security slipup,236 police response to a drunken man's threats,2 37 emergency medical
technicians' botched rescue of a baby, 238 student-on-student public
school violence, 239 and highway administrators' maintenance of a
dangerous stretch of road.24 ° While the focus of this Article is on
doctrinal divergence, application even of settled law to new facts can
make law 24' because "fleshing out by application of principle to different
facts is vital to common-law adjudication. 24 2 The Third Circuit's
obligation to explain the law in precedential decisions is perhaps greater
in the substantive due process context because the legal standard of
"shocks the conscience" draws its meaning from particular factual
applications.243 Third Circuit judges themselves have labeled "shocks the
conscience" as "amorphous and imprecise, 244 and "hardly a test at
all., 245 More specifically, in the state-created danger arena lawmaking
235. Brown, 318 F.3d at 482 (citing Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir.
1994)).
236. Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Nos. 99-1980, 00-1647 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2001) (unpublished
and non-precedential) (on file with author).
237. Burke, No. 99-1357.
238. Brown, 318 F.3d at 475.
239. Combs v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 32 F. App'x 653 (3d Cir. 2002).
240. Solum v. Yerusalim, No. 99-1607 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2000) (unpublished and non-precedential)
(on file with author).

241. See supra Part [. B.
242. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 21; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1190; id.at
1196, 1176, 1182-83; supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
243. See Cappalli, supra note 48.
244. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir.1994).
245. Id.
at 1319 (Cowen, J., joined by Becker, Scirica, & Lewis, JJ., dissenting).

Vol. 81:217, 2006

Washington Law Review

by application is likely since the test is inherently ambiguous,

246

derives

47

meaning from factual contexts, and applies to widely differing factual
circumstances. For all of these reasons, appellate courts should hesitate
before disposing of state-created danger claims in non-precedential
opinions.
CONCLUSION
Federal appellate courts are overworked and need relief. While nonprecedential opinions usually are justified as an efficient solution to
overburdened federal appellate courts, the doctrinal inconsistency
between a circuit's precedential and non-precedential opinions
demonstrated in this case study of a single constitutional doctrine
undercuts that rationale because doctrinal divergences may result in
relitigation of issues resolved at the appellate level and may lead
plaintiffs and defendants to value cases differently. Doctrinal
inconsistency can potentially result in more litigation and fewer
settlements. 248 This Article demonstrates that the risks posed by issuing
non-precedential opinions have been realized by the Third Circuit's
application of one doctrine-state-created danger-over a seven-year
span. That demonstration suggests that the current system should be
reformed.
The elimination of non-precedential appellate opinions is neither
realistic nor desirable as it likely would result in repetitive opinions,
increased workload for individual judges, 249 and an increased need for en
banc overruling of inconsistent precedent. 250 Nor would it be a desirable
alternative to eliminate non-precedential opinions in favor of a
wholesale return to judgment orders, which generally are very short
orders unanimously affirming the judgment reviewed. 251 As federal court
246. See supra Parts IV.A., C.
247. Cappalli, supra note 48, at 779.
248. See supra Parts IV.A.5, B.2, C.4, D.3.
249. See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
250. See Slavitt, supra note 26, at 130 (arguing that "[ilf publication were universal, judges and
litigants would be able to refer to and review the entire body of precedent rather than a limited and
unrepresentative subset" but acknowledging that "[ilf writing a wellerafted opinion for every case is
not possible, then universal publication could result in more carelessly written decisions that might
distort the system of precedent.").
251. See 3D CIR. lOP 6.2.1, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf ("A
judgment order is filed when the panel unanimously determines to affirm the judgment or order of
the district court. . . and determines that a written opinion will have no precedential or institutional
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scholar Lauren Robel has observed, the judgment order option "has
proven unattractive to litigants and judges alike: summary decision
serves none of the legitimating functions of appeal and may leave parties
252
with the feeling that the court never considered their arguments.,
However, use of judgment orders in certain appeals might help the
overburdened Third Circuit to manage its docket. An appellate judgment
order might be used without frustrating litigants where the reasons for
affirmance are spelled out by the district court opinion.2 53 At least one
Third Circuit judge, the Honorable Theodore A. McKee, would endorse
the "considered use of judgment orders in civil cases where the district
court opinion can be affirmed substantially for the reasons stated by the
district court. 2 54
Further, the evidence in this Article supports incremental reforms to
promote uniformity between published and unpublished opinions. As an
initial step, ending the Third Circuit's tradition of prohibiting its own
citation of its non-precedential opinions would promote doctrinal
uniformity.25 5 A finding by a Third Circuit panel that an unpublished
opinion is helpful would simply demonstrate that the prediction of "no
future usefulness" made by the authoring Third Circuit panel was
incorrect. Moreover, proposed new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
32.1 prohibits the circuits from imposing restrictions on the citation of
non-precedential opinions and, should the draft Rule approved by the
Supreme Court take effect, which will happen unless Congress acts, the
new Rule likely will supersede the Third Circuit's self-imposed
restriction.
value."). A judgment order for civil cases "may contain one or more references to cases or other
authorities." Id. lOP 6.3.2.
252. Robel, supra note 27, at 943; see Slavitt, supra note 26, at 132 ("When a court hands down
an opinion without stating its reasoning, the litigant may perceive that the court has not fulfilled its
promise of justice."). The Third Circuit was criticized for its former more frequent reliance on
judgment orders. Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157 (1998). The Third Circuit reduced reliance on judgment orders when Judge Becker
became Chief Judge: "I persuaded my colleagues that we owed a greater duty to our colleagues at
the bar and to their clients.. . as a matter of respect.., and accountability.... [Olne line orders
should not be the way the Courts of Appeals do business." Becker, supranote 7, at 4-5.
253. 3D CIR. lOP 6.3.2, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/lOP-Final.pdf

("A

judgment order may state that the case is affirmed by reference to the opinion of the district court or
").
decision of the administrative agency ....
254. Telephone Interview with the Hon. Theodore A. McKee, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 7, 2006).
255. 3D CIR. 1OP 5.7, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf, see supra

note 70.
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A more significant step toward ensuring doctrinal uniformity would
be to expressly accord non-precedential opinions persuasive value,
consistent with the common law tradition of empowering the applying
court to assess the persuasive value of a judicial decision. This also
could be accomplished by amendment of internal circuit rules.
Persuasive value is not precedential value: "the decision must persuade
on its own argumentative merits, without regard for its status as a
precedent or for any notions of stare decisis."256 This is the model
adopted by the trial court that, in the opening vignette of this Article,
rejected the parent's claim by relying in part on a non-precedential
opinion.2 57 This is also the model followed by the trial court that invoked
the Third Circuit's non-precedential update to the "shocks the
conscience" standard.2 58 The Third Circuit should put its imprimatur on
this practice.
While the Third Circuit does not currently limit litigant or district
court reliance on its non-precedential opinions, conferring persuasive
value would serve the values of uniformity, fairness, and predictability
by reducing district court (or panel) reluctance to rely on nonprecedential opinions. 259 Expressly conferring persuasive value on nonprecedential opinions would encourage district courts to rely on them as
they would appellate dicta: as "probative of future decisionmaking, to
promote judicial economy by avoiding appellate reversal., 260 A district
court persuaded by a non-precedential opinion could confidently rely on
it as legitimate authority, promoting district court judicial economy by
reducing incentives to buttress the ruling with alternate grounds.2 61
Former Third Circuit Chief Judge Becker supported permitting parties to
cite non-precedential opinions because they "give us the benefit of the

256. Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoffto Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts
Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 11 (2002).

257. See White v. City of Philadelphia, 118 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (relying on
Solum, a non-precedential lawmaking opinion that applied the state-created danger doctrine to the
novel facts of a direct claim by the parent of the decedent).
258. See Brozusky ex rel. Brozusky v. Hanover Twp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 606,613 (M.D. Pa. 2002)
(relying on Pahler);see also Smith v. Dep't of Gen. Servs., No. 04-0997, 2005 WL 1563505, at *1
(M.D. Pa. July 1, 2005).
259. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (district court refusing to rely on nonprecedential opinion and stating that "it was incorrect of [another district court judge] to cite [a nonprecedential state-created danger opinion]").
260. Caminker, supra note 64, at 76.
261. See White, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 573-74 (relying on non-precedential ruling but articulating
alternate grounds); Brozusky, 222 F. Supp. 2d at613-16 (same).
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thinking of a previous panel and help us to focus on or think through the
issues[,] ... help District Judges in the same way they help us ... [, and]
are sufficiently lucid that their citation can be valuable. 26 2 Those
reasons equally support explicit permission for courts and litigants to
rely on non-precedential opinions for their persuasive value. Building on
the models of the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,26 3 such a
rule should expressly permit panels and district courts to rely on a nonprecedential opinion as persuasive authority without discouraging such
reliance.
The alternative view has obvious force-that the proper role of a
federal trial court is to apply binding law, not to predict the future course
of binding law, using non-precedential opinions as divining rods. 26 But
the goal of promoting doctrinal uniformity in circuit decisions, thus
eliminating the dilemma for district courts, is better served by
transparency. The goal of promoting doctrinal uniformity is better
served, that is, by increasing the likelihood that non-precedential
reasoning will surface in district court decisions, if persuasive to a
federal judge.
Citation of unpublished opinions for persuasive value, rather than
265
citation as precedent, as the District of Columbia Circuit permits,
262. Becker, supra note 7, at 1-2.
263. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4, available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/docs/5thCir-IOP.pdf
(unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are "not precedent" but such opinions
"may, however, be persuasive," and may be cited); 8TH CIR. R. 28(A)(i), available at
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/newrules/coa/localrulesdec05.pdf (unpublished opinions "are not
precedent and parties generally should not cite them," but parties may do so if the opinion "has
persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve
as well"); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3, available at http://www.cal 0.uscourts.gov/rules.cfm?part=8&ID=135
(unpublished decisions "are not binding precedents," and their citation is "disfavored," but an
unpublished decision may be cited if it has "persuasive value with respect to a material issue that
has not been addressed in a published opinion" and it would "assist the court in its disposition");
I1TH CIR. R. 36-2, available at http://www.call.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/BlueAUG05.pdf
(unpublished opinions "are not considered binding precedent," but "may be cited as persuasive
authority"); Id. R. 36-3, IOP 6, available at http://www.call.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/
BlucAUG05.pdf ("Reliance on unpublished opinions is not favored by the court.").
264. See Caminker, supra note 64, at 73 ("[O]pportunities for successful prediction of the
behavior of courts of appeals by district courts would likely be few, given ex ante uncertainty about
which judges would actually make up the reviewing appellate court panel.").
265. D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Court Rules"
hyperlink; then follow "Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Circuit Rules/FRAP" hyperlink) ("All
unpublished orders or judgments of this court ... entered on or after January 1, 2002, may be cited
as precedent."). The Third Circuit's tradition of requiring en bane reversal of a precedential panel
opinion, see 3D CIR. lOP 9.1, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf, is not
available at
Cf
7TH CIR. R. 40(e),
tradition.
the
only
law-of-the-circuit
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would allow a Third Circuit panel to overturn the non-precedential
266
decision in a precedential decision, without en banc review. The Third
Circuit could reject non-precedential reasoning without convening en
banc because
the law-of-the-circuit rule apparently does not apply to
unpublished opinions, because they are not "precedents." The
"persuasive authority" approach thus enables a circuit panel to
reject an unpublished opinion as unpersuasive-with reasons, of
course-without having to take the case en banc or otherwise to
formally overrule the opinion.267
Such a process would help to ensure efficiency by conserving judicial
resources.
Adopting specific internal rules for determining publication, in place
of the existing panel prediction that the opinion has value only to the
trial court or parties, would be a further step toward reducing doctrinal
divergence in non-precedential opinions.2 6 8 While a detailed publication
policy is no guarantee of adherence, "plans with specific criteria are
preferable to broad, generally worded plans.., because of the difficulty
of appreciating 'precedential value' at the time of decision., 269 The
internal policy should reflect concern not only for the court's lawdeclaring function-such as when the district court has wrestled with a
Supreme Court decision issued since the last circuit precedent-but also
for the litigants' and district courts' need for examples of established
doctrine applied to novel facts. Appellate courts should incline toward
publication whenever the legal doctrine has a vague and indeterminate
legal test or the cases applying that doctrine arise in widely variable
factual circumstances-or both, as is true of the state-created danger
doctrine-because the appellate panel cannot predict with certainty that
such decisions will not be useful to future courts or litigants.270 More
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules.htm#cr40 ("Rehearing Sua Sponte Before Decision. A
proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position which would overrule a prior
decision of this court or create a conflict between or among circuits shall not be published unless it
is first circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to
rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be adopted.")
266. Barnett, supra note 256, at 22-23.
267. Id.
268. A non-precedential opinion "appears to have value only to the trial court or the parties," 3D
CIR. lOP 5.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf, while a precedential
opinion "has precedential or institutional value," Id. IOP 5.2. See also supra note 14.
269. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1177.
270. See supra notes 46-52, 54 and accompanying text.
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specifically, the Third Circuit should incline to publish state-created
danger claims against municipalities because the Third Circuit's direct
municipal liability doctrine is still evolving and not susceptible to
routine application.27 '
Patterned on existing detailed circuit court publication guidelines,
such an internal policy should counsel publication as precedent when the
opinion:
" establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, criticizes, or explains a rule
of law;
* applies an established rule to novel facts or otherwise serves as a
significant guide to future litigants and district courts;
" contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative;
* involves a legal or factual issue of significant public interest;
" resolves an apparent conflict between panels of this court, or
creates a conflict with a decision in another circuit; or
" is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion; or reverses
the decision below or affirms it upon different grounds.272
Further, such an internal policy should allow for the possibility that an
outsider to the litigation will recognize an opinion's precedential
significance even if the appellate panel and parties to the litigation have
concluded otherwise. The policy therefore should expressly permit any
person to request that a non-precedential opinion be published as
precedent, for any of the above reasons, and within a short period of
time. 273 Conversely, a publication policy might counsel against
publication as precedent when the opinion concerns primarily state and
271. See supraPart IV.D.4.
272. The above suggested criteria are based on the Model Rule drafted by the Advisory Council
on Appellate Justice, see Reynolds & Richman, supra note 18, at 1171 n.28, 1176, and on the
internal operating procedures of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and D.C. Circuits. 1ST CIR. Loc. R.
36, available at http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/files/rules/RulesApril O_06.pdf, 4TH CIR. Loc. R.
36(a)-(b), available at http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/rules.pdf; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, available at
6TH CIR. R. 206(a), available at
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/docs/5thCir-IOP.pdf;
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/intemet/rules-and-procedures/pdf/rules2004.pdf,
9TH CIR. R.
available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules.htm;

7TH CIR. R. 53,
36-2, available at

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov (follow "FRAP & Local Circuit Rules" hyperlink, then follow "FRAP
& Local Circuit Rules" hyperlink); D.C. CIR. R. 36(a), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov
(follow "Court Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Circuit Rules/FRAP"
hyperlink). The above suggested criteria do not address how the publication decision should be
affected by whether the decision reviewed was itself published, whether the decision is on remand
from the U.S. Supreme Court, or other important considerations addressed in the publication plans
of various federal circuits but beyond the scope of this Article.
273. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(d), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov (follow "Court
Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Circuit Rules/FRAP" hyperlink).
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not federal law. 274 Non-precedential opinions are an administrative
remedy for the excessive workload of federal appellate judges. This
article's documentation of doctrinal divergence between precedential
and non-precedential opinions supports the incremental policy changes
outlined here but could also support structural reforms proposed
elsewhere to address the core problem of docket volume. Evaluation of
the many existing proposals for structural reform-for example, either to
reduce the size of the job or to increase the number of judges handling
the job-is a rich subject for future exploration.

274. 1 am grateful to the Honorable Theodore A. McKee, United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, for pointing this out. Telephone Interview with the Hon. Theodore A. McKee, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 7, 2006).

